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The Problem with John Searle's Mind
By: John Maes

In his book Mind, University of California at Berkeley philosopher John Searle is on a mission to solve the “problem” of dualism, especially the mind-body “problem” most commonly associated with the thinking of Rene Descartes. Many have grappled with this issue before, but Searle proposes to accomplish this task in a unique manner without espousing either the tenets of materialism or idealism.

From the onset this appears to be an impossible task because everyone has always in some way fallen into three camps in their views of what reality consists of, these being some version of materialism, idealism or dualism. There really are no other alternatives, which is to say the choices are that 1) everything is physical in some sense of the word, 2) everything is not physical and what we perceive as physical is an illusion, or 3) in the totality of everything there are both physical and non-physical aspects of reality. There are, of course, numerous nuance variations on these themes and there are some existents that do not fit neatly into the physical or non-physical boxes, but in some fashion at least the above choices are what are available.

In this scheme of things the only people who disagree with a dualistic view are either materialists or idealists. For those who agree with a dualistic view, there is no problem and thus no needed solution. Searle’s position is that he professes to strongly disagrees with dualism, also differs with materialism, entirely dismisses the notion of idealism, and thus attempts to stand outside conventional perspectives and break new ground.

Descartes’ dualism consists of claiming some parts of reality are physical (objects and the like), and some parts are non-physical (mind, in particular). One of the primary reasons presented for claiming Descartes’ mind-body distinction as a problem is because it violates the theory that physical reality is a causally closed system that cannot be affected by anything outside the physical realm, and that in effect nothing exists outside the physical realm. It follows from this premise, the argument goes, that either 1) two distinctly different parts or reality cannot interact, or 2) even if they could somehow interact there is no satisfactory explanation as to how this is accomplished. This, the critics say, is a problem, and as long as this condition persists then a dualistic perspective is inherently problematic. These considerations only present a problem for non-dualists, however, because dualists reject the validity of these obviously materialistic theories, and indeed there is no convincing evidence to corroborate these theories. In a dualistic framework the physical and the non-physical intertwine, are interconnected and interdependent. Searle says the existence of the mind is dependent upon brain processes. It is fair to add that there are instances that brain processes may also be dependent upon the mind.
Traditionally a brain and a mind are considered to be two different things. A brain can be examined by the senses and weighed and measured, whereas a mind cannot. Searle’s belief that the mind is a product of the brain does not alter that there is an obvious dualism here. The end result for both Descartes and Searle is that brains and minds both exist. It is really inconclusive as to whether the mind is dependent upon the brain, the brain dependent upon the mind, or that neither is dependent upon one another. It is certain, however, that some things that exist can be perceived by the senses and weighed and measured, and others cannot. The most uncompromising form of dualism holds that the two are independent, but any system that admits the existence of the two, even if one is dependent on the other, is dualistic in that both the physical and the non-physical coexist within the realm of overall reality.

Throughout his book Searle reveals a preferential bias toward materialism and physical science. He laments, for instance, that the social sciences have proven to be less exact and predictable than have physical sciences. This is seen by him as a disappointment and a failure, but to those who strongly disagree with the goals of positivism to impose the laws of physics onto social behavior this is a triumph and a cause for celebration. In another instance Searle refers to consciousness as being scientifically irrelevant. To the contrary, however, science is entirely indebted to consciousness for its very existence. Without consciousness science would not exist at all. Physical science is something thought up by consciousness as an organized way of thinking about the physical aspects of reality. Science, per se, is an organized way of thinking about any subject matter, and thus there exists a field of study known as science of mind. Individual scientists may disagree whether or not there is such a thing as mind, but science itself has no opinion.

Continuing in his bias toward this preferred universality of physical science, Searle offers the opinion that belief in the idea of immortality of the soul is extremely unlikely and irrational. The basis offered for this opinion is that immortality of the soul is inconsistent with the laws of physical science. It is important to note, however, that the laws of physical science pertain only to the physical aspects of reality. As noted previously Searle recognizes that the laws of physics do not extend to all of reality, as when he acknowledges the failure of positivism to apply these laws to social sciences. While there is sufficient evidence regarding the impermanence of physical reality, this evidence is lacking regarding non-physical reality. Some non-physical aspects of reality, such as ideas conceived by people whose bodies are no longer living and have decayed, continue to exist vibrantly, and thus these ideas have exhibited a tendency toward permanence more so than has the body.. This by no means confirms that souls, if souls exist at all, are immortal. There is in fact no compelling evidence one way or the other concerning immortality, and thus Searle’s disbelief in immortality is no more or less unlikely or irrational that the opposite belief. As Immanuel Kant pointed out in his Critique of Pure Reason , where the scope of knowledge ends one is entirely free to choose and decide upon what to believe, as when he rhetorically asks “...are we not at liberty, where we cannot make assertions, at least to invent theories and to have opinions?” This is exactly what Searle does when he asserts that immortality is unlikely or irrational. The choice of belief is always up to the individual in his or her pursuit of truth, and Searle’s choice is distinctly consistent with that of materialism.

Searle’s starting point is to discredit dualism and to resolve what he perceives as problems inherent within it. In the end, however, he is left with a series of dualisms and problems of his own. In the text of his book Searle posits the dualism of observer independent and observer dependent aspects of reality, the dualism of intrinsic intentionality and derived intentionality, the dualism of inner experience and external behavior, the dualism of neurobiological process and conscious states, and most importantly the dualism between brains and minds. On page 16 of his book Searle provides a side by side list of examples of mental and physical existents. On page 131 he refutes materialism and states that non-physical aspects of reality are “things we all know to exist.” He then goes on to define dualism as the view that both mental (non-physical) and physical aspects of reality both exist. Why is it, then, that Searle is seemingly in denial that he himself is a dualist, albeit one with a bias toward materialism? How can he seriously dispute the perspective of dualism?

In attempting to resolve Descartes’ mind-body dualism Searle nonetheless attempts to avoid either a dualistic or materialistic solution, but in fact his resultant biological naturalism theory is a bit of both. In western philosophy materialism dates to pre-Socratic times as a monistic system devised by Democritus. According to Democritus all of reality is entirely physical, and in some way composed of tiny atoms. He thought eventually science would progress to the point where these atomic structures of things like ideas and values would come to be visually seen by powerful instruments. When this never came about and it became apparent it never would, rather than rejecting the theory of materialism entirely, later materialists decided to redefine the meaning of the word. This system of modified materialism, which has since become the accepted version, states that everything is either material or else is attributable to and originating from material. Thus it could be maintained that things like ideas and values do exist but are not material things, and that they were simply products of the brain, which is material. It is at this juncture that philosophical materialism abandoned its monistic framework and replaced it a dualistic viewpoint of two types of real things - material things and non-material things that are caused by materiality, such as ideas and values emanating from the brain. Ironically, materialism itself is entirely immaterial, which is to say that in no way is materialism a physical object.

Materialism isn’t what it used to be, and it hasn’t been for a long time. The kind of materialism Searle refutes is the extreme materialism of Democritus, which has been out of vogue and indefensible for hundreds of years. Searle’s main theory that non-physical reality (mind in this case) is a by-product of matter (brain) is not at all original and for the most part is simply a restatement of modified materialism. Searle does insist that the mind is not material nor reduceable to matter, but he does think the very existence of mind is attributable to matter.

Searle claims to have invented a view a reality that is neither materialism nor dualism, but it is actually a bit of both. Searle states that most contemporary philosophers are materialists, although he cites no names, and presumably these are academic philosophers. Throughout the history of western philosophy, however, significant philosophers who have espoused materialism are scarce. Other than Democrcitus and Thomas Hobbes, it is difficult to name one. For a period of time Bertrand Russell subscribed to a strict materialist doctrine, but eventually recanted when he realized it did not account for non-physical aspects of reality such as values.

Although Searle’s solution to the perceived mind-body problem is strikingly similar to modified materialism, there is a significant point of difference. Searle is passionately insistent that there is such a thing as in immaterial mind, albeit owing its existence to matter. It is in this claim that Searle parts company with materialism altogether. Materialists have been forced to grudgingly come to terms with aspects of non-physical reality such as ideas and values, but the concept of mind is irrelevant to materialism. From the standpoint of materialism there either is no such thing as mind or else it is entirely equivalent with the brain. In either case, it is not something immaterial. The concept of a non-physical mind is no more real for a materialists than are ghosts or unicorns.
In the final analysis there are more similarities between the thought of Descartes and Searle than there are dissimilarities. For each there is a body and there is a mind. Searle draws some solace from his belief that the mind is created by the brain and therefore is dependent upon the realm of physical phenomena. In this system, however, once matter creates non-matter, there results a dualism not all that different than that of Descartes. The difference is that for Descartes the physical and non-physical each exist autonomously as equivalent aspects of reality, whereas Searle believes the existence of the mind is subservient to that of the brain. In support of this Searle cites instances of how a physical problem with the brain can adversely affect the mind, as in loss of memory for instance. This is certainly true, but it is equally true and well documented, although Searle makes no mention of it, that the mind may affect the body, as when one adopts a positive mental attitude that results in improved physical health, or conversely when pessimism results in ill effects on one’s health.

Since in Searle’s system there exists both a mind and a body, the existence of these entities as such is not really a problem for Searle. The essence of the problem for Searle is rather how it is that these two seemingly disparate realms of reality coexist and interact. The question Searle and others before him have posed is how can there be causal relations between these two quite different aspects of reality? He maintains there has never before been a satisfactory answer to this question.

The answer, however, has been there all along and is blatantly obvious. Physical and non-physical aspects of reality certainly do have their differences, but they can and do interact causally due to their commonality - they are both part of the totality of reality. The physical and the non-physical interconnect in much the same way that hot and cold water may interconnect. One is hot and one is cold, but both are water. Granted hot and cold water are both physical, but the causal connection is quite similar. When one makes up one’s mind to build a house and then goes about constructing it there is a causal connection. This sort of thing happens all the time. There is no problem here. Everything that exists is part of reality. Anything that exists can interact with anything else that exists. How can anyone seriously doubt that physical and non-physical aspects of reality can interact? How could they possibly not? This so called mind-body problem is the single greatest disaster in the history of philosophy over the past few centuries.
Searle refers to his idea that the mind exists dependently as a by-product of matter as the theory of biological naturalism. He sees the attribution of mind to matter as the solution to what he perceived as being a long standing problem, but this solution is not any more or less problematic than is the point of departure, which was how can anything mental cause or interact with something physical? Biological naturalism merely presents the same situation, only in reverse - how can something material (the brain) cause something non-physical (the mind)? This is the biological naturalism problem. It results in a dualism with two divisions of reality, and is no more or less problematic than Descartes’ postulation. As John Locke observed in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, i.e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i.e. matter, to exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Descartes, Rene, Discourse On Method and other writings, translated by Arthur Wollaston, Penguin Books, 1962.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin’s Press, 1929. (page 613 cited)

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, The World Publishing Company, 1964. (pages 196-7 cited)

Searle, John, Mind, Oxford University Press, 2004.

John Maes is a part time non-academic philosopher residing in Oakland, California, and holds a B.A. in philosophy from Southern Illinois University.

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

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