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Should the Practice of Promising Be Discarded?
By: Tamela Ice

Joseph DeMarco and Richard Fox say that a promise is an assurance that whatever has been promised will be done. DeMarco and Fox make the further claims that this assurance is “either illusory or immoral,” and thus “the practice of promising should be discarded.” In this paper, I will explicate the argument DeMarco and Fox provide in support of these claims. I will argue the DeMarco and Fox do not prove as much as they claim and that the problem they have with promising does not damage the practice of promising to the extent that it should be discarded.

§

DeMarco and Fox define promises as “typically linguistic acts which are thought to create moral obligations.” Promises are supposed to give assurance to the promisee that the thing being promised will be done. The “Promisor creates the obligation by saying “I promise” … the promisee, by virtue of the obligation, is supposed to have the right to make a moral claim against the promisor.” DeMarco and Fox claim that this obligation is self-imposed by the individual who makes the promise. Moreover, without the assurance supposedly provided by the act of promising, “a promise is deceptive.” DeMarco and Fox argue that “a genuine assurance, backed by a special moral obligation, is morally problematic … Promising is, as a rule, immoral.” DeMarco and Fox state the dilemma as follows:
Either the supposed duty to keep promises overrides other considerations or it does not. If it does, it is an act of moral myopia because it renders other considerations null and void. If not, a promise cannot serve its function: it cannot, with moral weight, be used to give assurances.

DeMarco and Fox attempt to show that this is in fact the case with regard to promises by illustrating a similar problem with degenerate, near degenerate and normal cases of promising.

DeMarco and Fox allege that the “reasons for breaking promises … are also reasons for regarding promises as degenerate in the first place.” Why do we consider promises to be degenerate? DeMarco and Fox give various examples of degenerate promises: promising the impossible; promising the immoral; promising the unlikely; and promising the ridiculous. I will present the author’s analysis of each kind of degenerate promise, followed by a similar account of near degenerate promises and normal promises. It will become clear why DeMarco and Fox think all promises are immoral.

Promising the impossible is stated in DeMarco and Fox as follows:
A promises x to B, and x is considered by A, and perhaps by B, to be impossible to perform, e.g., cure an incurable disease, be in two places at once, loan money a person does not have, etc.

DeMarco and Fox say this type of promise may be instantly dismissed “just because (if “ought” implies “can”) nobody can be obligated to do the impossible.” Whether the impossibility of performing the promised act is know to either the promisor or the promisee, the promisee relies on the promises and acts accordingly. For example, as DeMarco and Fox note, “ an impossible promise might be made to a person in some seriously dangerous situation. Because the person in danger relies on the promise, he or she might not attempt other possible routes of defense or escape.” In this type of situation, the promise may turn out to be harmful to the promisee. The assurance of rescue that the promisee relies on cannot be forthcoming in an impossible promise-making situation.

Another example of a degenerate promise is promising the immoral. According to this type of promise,
A promises x to B, and x is considered by A, and perhaps by B, to be immoral, e.g., to rob a bank, go against one’s parent’s wishes, torture someone, get revenge, gang up on another, etc.

DeMarco and Fox consider this type of promise as seeking justification for doing something immoral, and “since a person cannot be obligated by a promise to do something immoral, making or eliciting such promises appears to be wrong.” Promising the immoral will often conflict with other moral obligations. However, as DeMarco and Fox point out, different people will place a greater or less degree of importance on different promises. One person may believe that promises should be kept simply because something was promised. For another, the promise is only binding if there is not some overriding obligation or alternative to keeping the promise. These ambiguities are noteworthy for DeMarco and Fox because “promises are intended to provide assurances.”
In promising the unlikely,
A promises x to B while A knows that the occurrence of x is highly unlikely.

This is a type of degenerate promise because a highly unlikely outcome cannot be assured. DeMarco and Fox say that this leads to a further problem with promising – social pressure. As the authors say,
Sometimes a person who knowingly promises the unlikely is simply yielding to social pressure. If pressure is put on A to make a promise, A may accede, knowing that the promise will not be kept. Promises are often made in such coercive or semi-coercive situations. Pressure is brought to bear on person to make promises (when they believe it would be better not to do so) based on close personal or business relationships. Persons may also promise the unlikely in order to influence promisees. For example, an auto salesperson may promise an unlikely quick delivery of a car to pressure a buyer to sign the contract. A promisee is (unfortunately) likely to respond to a promise in a way that is different from a mere statement of intention. So another side of promising the unlikely is the possible exploitation of the promisee. Thus, in many cases, promises mask coercion.

It would seem that promising the unlikely does not involve offering an assurance, but procuring a benefit for the promisor.

The final example of a degenerate promise is promising the ridiculous. In this type of promise,
A promises x to B, and x is considered by A, and perhaps by B, to be foolish or ridiculous, e.g., promising to stand on one’s head if B wins the game, promising to walk to Kansas if Cleveland wins the pennant, etc.

These kinds of promises may be brushed aside as too silly to be considered as obligatory. This is precisely the point DeMarco and Fox want to make. Promising the ridiculous is degenerate because, along with providing assurances, promises are supposed to obligate. Perhaps promising the ridiculous is not promising at all. If it is, then as DeMarco and Fox say, such promises are often about something said in jest, not intended to be taken seriously. However, if either party takes the promise seriously, “the promisee may then hold the promisor to the act in question … Doing the thing promised may not mean doing something immoral, or even something difficult, but it may mean placing undue importance or priority on something which, all things considered should not be given that much time or attention.” Because each party involved may have a different view as to the seriousness or bindingness of what is promised, “promising may require a “meeting of minds,” as does a contract. But if so, almost all promises, as they are conventionally made, fail to be binding.”

Degenerate promises are immoral because they fail to obligate and they cannot provide the assurances required by promises. What about near degenerate cases of promising? Examples of near degenerate promises in DeMarco and Fox are: promising the distasteful; promising the superfluous; and the recalcitrant future.
DeMarco and Fox say there is some basis of comparison between promising the highly unlikely and promising the distasteful. In promising the distasteful,
A promises x to B, yet A does not want x because x is not to A’s benefit; A has no other obligation to do x, but is pressed into doing it by B’s insistence, or because A feels obliged to do x for B, e.g., promising a friend to go on a date with a person thought to be thoroughly obnoxious.

This type of promising, according to DeMarco and Fox, “involves, perhaps, a kind of moral or personal weakness … [which] may place people under obligations to violate their own interests.” Promising the distasteful can be seen as coercive in that one feels pressured to comply. It is not clear whether one can obligate oneself to act against one’s own interest. Moreover, the assurance that the promisor will do what is promised is uncertain. For example, the person who promises to date someone obnoxious may make the promise will the full intention of faking an illness at the last minute. Thus, this type of promise is immoral on one count, it is coercive, and possibly on a second count if the promisor has no intention of doing what is promised. The promise and assumed assurance are, or can be, deceptive.

When one promises the superfluous, no promise is necessary in order for a person to do the act promised.
A promises x to B, yet, under ordinary circumstances, A would do x without promising to do it, e.g., A borrows $5.00 from B, on the understanding that A will return it during the next pay period, but B insists that A promise to return the money after being paid.

Why is a promise like this made? Apparently, the promisee wants something more than what is provided in the understanding. These promises,, according to DeMarco and Fox, “make it seem as though promising does some important work. They create the appearance that the outcome is assured.” This may, however, be an illusory assurance. That is, a change in circumstances may provide reasons for breaking the promises. Thus, in promising, the promisor can give no more than was present in an understanding between the parties involved, and the need for the promise is unclear.

The consideration of a change in circumstances leads to the final example of near degenerate promises – the recalcitrant future. When making this kind of promise,
A person promises an action that seems unobjectionable, but, because of the future course of events, the promised act becomes impossible, distasteful, improbable, or immoral.

DeMarco and Fox say that “No matter how unobjectional or normal they appear, all promises are made in the face of an unpredictable future. Thus all promises, even promises taken to be paradigmatically normal, lie close to near degeneracy.” Thus, it appears that no promise can provide the assurance demanded of it. No one can guarantee that the future will be such that the conditions under which the promise was made will continue to hold in the future.

DeMarco and Fox also discuss the unfairness of promising. The assurances provided by promises suggest “a disproportionate gain for one or another of the parties involved, such that exploitation or coercion, even if mild in nature, may be present.” The types of promises used to illustrate degenerate and near degenerate cases of promising are intended to reveal this unfairness. Thus, according to DeMarco and Fox, there may be an unjustified burden on either the promisor or the promisee, or both to act on what may be an immoral promise. Moreover, there may be an “unjustified dependence on the promise itself.”

DeMarco and Fox conclude their argument by providing examples of apparently normal cases of promising that are problematic in the same way as the degenerate and near degenerate cases of promising. The first case illustrates the illusory nature of assurance.
Case #1. Professor Smith hates college meetings. She will not attend next Thursday’s meeting unless Professor Harris also attends. Although Harris says she is going, Smith wants to be sure. Because of Smith’s insistence, Harris eventually promises to go.

Smith, accepting the assurance of Harris’ promise, plans to attend the meeting and arranges her schedule accordingly. If both attend the meeting, there is no problem with this problem. However, DeMarco and Fox claim this type of promise is asymmetrical. The promise gives Smith assurance that Harris will attend the meeting, but Smith is not similarly obligated. Smith is “free of moral obligation in a way that Harris is not. The promise puts a moral burden on Harris but not on Smith.”

The second problem DeMarco and Fox have with this type of promise is it provides the appearance of assurance, but the promise is, in fact, conditional. That is, a change in circumstances may cause Harris to break her promise. If Harris takes a strong view of promising, she will keep the promise regardless of any circumstances that arise. If she takes the weak view, she may feel justified in breaking her promise to fulfill a more important obligation. DeMarco and Fox state the point as “the ambiguous nature of promising undermines the intended assurance, rendering it illusory.”

In what DeMarco and Fox refer to as an extreme example, they illustrate the difficulty for promising that arises when time changes people’s beliefs, attitudes, or habits. This raises the question of how long a promise is binding and what changes over time justify breaking a promise. This example emphasizes self-created promises.
Case #2. Kevin, at age 27, promised his uncle, a priest, that he would say the rosary every day. Now Kevin, 50 years old, no longer believes in prayer. But Kevin is a philosopher who believes in a deep self and in the creation of moral obligations through promises. He says the rosary each day, but expects to stop when his uncle, now 97 years old dies.

According to DeMarco and Fox, this type of self-created promise requires a stable identity over time. DeMarco and Fox point out “If we take a Cartesian view of the self – as a deep self – a promise is binding for life.” The authors say holding Kevin to this promise even if he did believe in prayer would seem odd. The fact that Kevin no longer believes in prayer renders the obligation to keep the promise ridiculous. As we have already seen, promising the ridiculous is morally problematic. If we view the self as a Derek Parfit self, then Kevin at 50 years of age is a different person from the 27 year old Kevin who made the promise. On this account of the self, promises have no binding power in the future. DeMarco and Fox conclude that, with regard to this type of promise, “the efficacy of promises is contingent on the lack of significant change in the promisor’s identity, for such a change can nullify the duty to keep the promise.” Unless one takes a Cartesian view of the self, it would appear that a promise cannot provide assurance that the act promised will be performed, the promisor does not know who he or she will be in the future.

The final example of what might appear to be a normal promise illustrates “the personal nature of obligation established by promising.” This type of promise shows how morally correct behavior is encouraged.
Case #3. Alice’s son is under-aged but often drinks and drives while intoxicated. He also believes that promises create strict moral obligations. However, he does not think that drunk driving is morally wrong. By withholding use of the car, Alice persuades him to promise that he will never drink when he drives the family car. Alice is convinced that he will keep his promise, but, in fact, he does not. Undaunted, Alice then succeeds in persuading her son to promise that he will never drive and drink, in anyone’s car under any circumstances.

DeMarco and Fox say that this type of promise seems to yield a momentary, albeit unstable, gain for Alice. She is getting what she wants. However, her son continues to drink and drive, so the gain is illusory. Moreover, Alice pressured her son into making the promise not to drink and drive. Thus, this type of promise is coercive, and “instability arises from coercion.” Alice’s son may not feel obligated to keep a promise he was pressured into making. DeMarco and Fox point out other scenarios in which Alice’s son may feel justified in breaking his promise. For example, if Alice and her son quarrel and cease speaking to each other, Alice’s son may consider the promise he made to his mother as null and void. He may not consider his mother to be the same person he made the promise to. If Alice dies, her son may think he has even more reason to be released from his promise.

DeMarco and Fox point out an oddity with Alice’s son in this example. He thinks that making a promise creates a strict obligation, but he does not hold such a strict position with regard to other “more important moral responsibilities. This is often the case among people who believe that promises create strict moral obligations, for they must then believe that promises override other moral considerations.” In this type of promise, although Alice’s son thinks promises are morally binding, he did not think his promise had binding force.

The three cases of seemingly normal promises show, according to DeMarco and Fox, that all promises are degenerate or near degenerate. DeMarco and Fox say “This suggests there may be something fundamentally wrong with the very idea of promising: the idea that a promise can serve the purpose of giving assurance by creating a self-imposed obligation.” Thus, the authors conclude that “promising seems to be a morally unjustified practice … tainted by a notion of honor that is entirely too subjective and too ambiguous to provide any genuine social advantage. By relying on promises and keeping promises, people are often exploited. At the very least, they are often disappointed.” The resolution suggested by DeMarco and Fox is to discard the practice of promising and “rely more on objective obligations: principles of justice and nonmaleficence, for example, and upon truth-telling, contracts, or explicit agreements, where the parties involved know that they cannot reasonably assure performance but understand that they may be held liable if they fail.”

In the final section of this paper I will show what DeMarco and Fox have proven with regard to promising, as well as what they have failed to prove.

§

DeMarco and Fox have established that promises cannot provide the assurance they are supposed to insofar as promises are made in the face of an uncertain future. DeMarco and Fox admit that their resolution cannot provide a greater degree of assurance than promises. The only difference between promising and the resolution proposed by DeMarco and Fox is the notion of liability. If a person fails to uphold a contract he or she may be forced to comply by a court of law. The law enforces principles of justice and protects the parties who commit to contracts and explicit agreements. It is not clear what the authors mean in saying we should rely more on truth-telling. What is true at this moment cannot be guaranteed in the future. Circumstances may arise that render it impossible to perform the act truthfully agreed to, just as a change in circumstances could make keeping a promise impossible. Future events could justify breaking an agreement, a contract, or a promise. My point is, insofar as assurance is concerned, the resolution proposed by DeMarco and Fox does not offer anything more than promising does.

The examples of degenerate, near degenerate and normal cases of promising provided by DeMarco and Fox are supposed to show that no promise can provide the assurance required by a promise. However, if we look closely at the examples, all of them are either degenerate or near degenerate. The supposedly normal cases are unfair, superfluous, or coercive. These are near degenerate examples. That is, DeMarco and Fox have not provided examples of anything other than degenerate or near degenerate examples of promises. They show that there are problems with some types of promises, but they show nothing about “normal” promises. Moreover, that some promises are degenerate or near degenerate does not establish that all promises are. Thus, the claim that the practice of promising should be discarded, based on the examples provided, is unwarranted. Granted, it is not clear that a normal promise will not include near degenerate characteristics. DeMarco and Fox, however, do not show this.

DeMarco and Fox want to discard the practice of promising because promises are too subjective. They point out several ambiguities that arise in promising and maintain this is enough to support their claim that all promises are either illusory or immoral. The ambiguities have more to do with particular promises than with the practice of promising. It seems that the real problem is with subjectivism, not with the objective practice of promising. If we are to discard a practice because it is subjective, then we would have to abandon the principles of justice as well. The principles of justice are objective. Whether people abide by those principles is a subjective matter, a matter of honor. DeMarco and Fox do not adequately prove that there is a significant difference between the objective principles of justice and the practice of promising to discard the latter. Both are socially beneficial. Without a satisfactory account of what a normal promise is, there is not sufficient reason to accept DeMarco and Fox’s conclusion.

Finally, there is an abundance of literature concerned with how, when and why promises obligate. DeMarco and Fox have illustrated the issue, but offer no resolution other than to abandon the practice of promising. Showing that there are problems with the notion of obligation is not enough to warrant abandonment of the practice of promising. Addressing this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, the issue is not easily resolved.

My aim in this paper has been to show that DeMarco and Fox do not provide reasons for discarding the practice of promising. Further investigation may reveal that promising is, in fact, an immoral practice and should be abandoned. That proof is not evidenced in DeMarco and Fox.

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

DeMarco, Joseph P. and Richard M. Fox. “Putting Pressure on Promises.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1992) Vol. XXX, No. 2, p. 57. DeMarco, Joseph P. and Richard M. Fox. “The immorality of promising.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 27:81-84, 1993, p. 83. “Pressure”, p. 46. Ibid. “immorality”, p. 81. Ibid. Ibid. “Pressure,” p. 49. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid. Ibid., p. 51. The authors include threats in the discussion of promising the immoral. Ibid.

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