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Kantian Leaps of Faith
By: Impenitent

After Immanuel Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason, his philosophy was assailed by critics that said Kant’s arguments amounted to nothing more than idealism as advanced by Bishop Berkeley in his writings. Kant was distressed by these claims and in the second addition of his work, he added much more argumentation to give his philosophy more weight. One entire section of the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason dealt specifically with the charge that Kant was an idealist. This section, entitled the “Refutation of Idealism,” has been the source of much philosophic debate ever since it was written. This paper will explore some of the reasons Kant wrote his “Refutation of Idealism” followed by a brief explanation of what he wrote within the section. This paper will then examine an article written by Vance G. Morgan which defends Kant’s argument against the idealism of Berkeley. The paper will continue with an examination of a different article written by Wilfrid Sellars which defends Kant’s argument without much reference to the second edition. The paper will then introduce the work of G. E. Moore who will argue that while the work of Kant and Berkeley are different, the materialist camp and the spiritualist camp of philosophy each begin with assumptions that are not proven nor provable. In conclusion, this paper will show that the materialist system of Kant requires as much of a leap of faith as the spiritualist system of Berkeley.

In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explained that he wrote the second edition in order that his work be understood as opposed to defend his work against being refuted. Kant’s system of philosophy is a bit complex as Kant himself admits, and through writing his second edition, Kant hopes to clarify and amplify previously illustrated positions. Kant argues that the understanding of his philosophic system is contained within the first edition of his work; however, in the second edition, he is adding some direction between the claims he advanced in the first edition. Kant adds that while the second edition may be easier to understand for some readers, all of the philosophic argumentation that is advanced within the second edition is found directly in the first edition.

Kant argues in the “Refutation of Idealism” that material idealism is either (a) problematic, that is doubtful and indemonstrable as suggested by Descartes or (b) dogmatic, that is false and indemonstrable as suggested by Berkeley. Kant claims that according to Berkeley, space itself is impossible and everything in space is imagined. Kant argues that dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if space is interpreted as a property that belongs to things in themselves. Kant believes that he has disproved dogmatic idealism through the creation of space and time via the transcendental aesthetic. Kant claims that problematic idealism is reasonable if sufficient proof of outer experience can be demonstrated, that is if one assumes that outer experience is not imaginary. Kant’s thesis behind the refutation is: “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

Kant’s argument in support of his thesis states that he is conscious of his own existence as determined in time. Kant argues that all determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. Kant argues that this “permanent” can not exist as an intuition in himself. Kant argues that all determinative grounds of his existence which are met within himself are nothing but representations. Kant argues that since they are representations themselves, they must be representing something “permanent” outside and distinct from them. The representations themselves are nothing but representations of something. Kant argues that this “permanent” is the relation in which the representations change and his existence in time changes is determined.

Thus, Kant argues that perception of the “permanent” is possible only through a thing outside himself and not through the mere representation of a thing outside himself. From this Kant argues that the determination of his existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which he perceives outside himself. Kant argues that the consciousness of his existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside himself.

Vance G. Morgan writes in “Kant and Dogmatic Idealism: A Defense of Kant’s Refutation of Berkeley,” (1) that: “Kant considers Cartesian skepticism to be the natural result of transcendental realism, a position directly opposed to Kant’s own transcendental idealism. The transcendental realist, on the one hand, “regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility (A369),” interpreting outer appearances “as things-in-themselves which exist independently of us and of our sensibility, and which are therefore outside us (A369).” Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, regards appearances “as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves (A369).“

Morgan argues further, “Kant claims that things can be outside us in either an empirical or a transcendental sense. Empirically external things are “things which are to be found in space” (A373). That which is transcendentally “outside us,” however, exists ontologically independent of us as human knowers. The transcendental realist considers space and the external objects in it to be external in the transcendental sense, existing “independently of us and of our sensibility (A369). According to transcendental idealism, however, there is no absolute space existing outside us in the transcendental sense. Rather, space itself, with all its appearances, as representations, is indeed, only in me” (A375). Space, for Kant, is a form of sensibility, not an absolute entity existing apart from me…. The mistake of the transcendental realist is to consider external objects in space as external in the transcendental sense rather than the empirical sense. If one considers objects as existing apart from the perceiver in absolute space that is also independent of the perceiver, one is necessarily led to doubt concerning the existence of external objects. The assumption that objects are transcendentally external, coupled with the premise that only inner states can be perceived, leads directly to empirical idealism, the doctrine that all we know with certainty is our inner states (entailing doubt concerning the external world.)”

Morgan’s argument continues: “Kant agrees that we can only know appearances within us. Transcendental idealism, however, allows him to be an empirical realist, due to the nature of Kantian space. External objects are empirically “outside us,” as they are in space. They are not transcendentally “outside us,” however, because the space they are “in” is a form of human sensibility, not something independent of us as perceiver.” Along these lines, Morgan picks up the argument later: “The distinction between space as a derivation from experience and space as an a priori condition of sensibility is the basis for Kant’s claim that Berkeley reduced bodies to mere illusion. Kant’s point is that the logical conclusion of Berkeley’s position that space is derived from experience is illusionism, regardless of what conclusion Berkeley intended. If one attempts to derive space from experience, space becomes another form of consciousness, dependent upon the sensations which it is abstracted from. This, for Kant, makes it impossible to distinguish truth from illusion in empirical knowledge. Truth requires “universal and necessary laws as its criteria” (Prol. 375), and such criteria cannot be provided if space is derived from experience. Space cannot be derived from experience, because space is presupposed in all experience.” Morgan’s defense of Kant’s refutation clearly demonstrates the differences between Kant’s and Berkeley’s ideas of space and plainly shows that the Kantian system may be accused of many things, but to have Kant’s system being accused of being idealist, as the Berkeley system admits to being, is not a defendable accusation.

Wilfrid Sellars argues in “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism“, (2) that : “Problematic idealism regards the claim that material things and processes exist per se as a coherent one, but one which can be established only by an inference from our perceptual states; an inference from effect to cause. Mental states have a privileged position in that they not only can have existence per se. but at is known, indeed 'directly' known, that some mental state exist per se.”

Sellars explains further: “Before looking at Kant's refutation of problematic idealism, it is worth pausing to ask: If this is 'problematic' idealism, what might 'dogmatic' idealism be? One would expect it to be the view that material objects in space and time could not have existence per se, i.e. that there was an absurdity or contradiction in the idea of the existence per se of material objects. Berkley certainly held this position, a fact which might strengthen the temptation to interpret dogmatic idealism along these lines.”

Sellars continues: “It is also worth noting that Berkeley did not deny that in a sense we (and a fortiori God) can conceive of material objects in space and time, where by the phrase 'material objects' I mean, so to speak, Lockean objects and not patterns of actual and counterfactual perceptual experiences. Berkeley can be construed as holding that our actual and counterfactual perceptual experiences are grounded in God's plan to cause us to have those experiences we would have if (a metaphysical counterfactual) there were material objects including human bodies with sense organs, and minds and bodies were able to interact. In less theological terms, this can be formulated as the view that what exists per se other than our minds is the causal ground of our actual and counterfactual perceptual experiences. To return to the main line of argument, it is only too clear that if we mean by 'dogmatic idealism' with respect to material objects the view that they cannot have existence per se, then Kant is a dogmatic idealist of the first water. Indeed as we have seen, Kant makes dogmatic idealism in this sense the very corner stone of his transcendental idealism.”

Sellars’ argument continues: “What then does Kant mean by dogmatic idealism? And is any such view to be found in Berkeley? It should be clear that the only answer to the first question which satisfies the requirements of the argument to date is that Kant means by dogmatic idealism the view that nothing spatial can be actual, where actual does not mean 'exists per se.' Indeed Kant's own idealism, while denying that material objects exist per se, nevertheless insists that some at least of the spatial objects which exist 'in our thoughts' and, in particular, in our acts and intuitions, or perceptual takings, are, in the critical sense, actual.”

Sellars illustrates: “Now if Berkeley had consistently held that perceived shapes are not features of mental states, but have existence only 'in our thoughts' (in the Cartesian sense) he could nevertheless have argued (perhaps on proto-Kantian grounds) that no shapes have existence per se. Shapes would not exist 'outside the mind' in what Kant called the transcendental sense. They would exist only 'in' the mind, not as features of its states but as immanent objects. Berkeley, however, because of the slippery slope pain-color-shape, makes the quite different claim that shapes can not exist 'outside the mind' in the sense in which pains can not exist outside the mind. Even though he is not prepared to say in so many words that shapes are essentially features of mental states, he actually commits himself to this position.”

Sellars draws out the distinction further: “Thus it is not unfair on Kant's part to attribute to Berkeley the view that the concept of shaped items which are not mental states is an incoherent one, as incoherent as would be the concept of a pain which was not a mental state. Now it is as evident to Kant as it was to Descartes that neither space itself nor any spatial object can be a modification of the mind or of a mental state. Thus, while Kant denies that either space or any spatial object has existence per se, and argues that the idea that they do is an incoherent one, he also argues that the idea of shapes which are not features of mental states is itself a coherent one. Thus, if shapes which are not features of mental states do not exist per se it is not because shapes are essentially features of mental states, but because shapes belong in space, and neither space nor anything in space can exist in itself.

Sellars argues further: “We can now begin to appreciate why in Kant's sense of the term Berkeley was a 'dogmatic idealist' and to interpret the following passage:

Berkeley . . . maintains that space, with all the things of which it is the inseparable condition, is in itself impossible and he therefore regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities (B 274). Given that Kant is clearly aware that on his own view neither space nor objects in space can exist in themselves, the gravamen of the charge against Berkeley must be that the latter's reason for holding this is such as to require, as his (Kant's) reasons do not, that ''things in space are merely imaginary entities." For, once again, Kant dearly has up his sleeve the view that material things, though they necessarily lack existence per se, which was the traditional concept of actuality, can in the critical sense be actual. On my interpretation Kant would be recognizing that Berkeley's reason for rejecting the existence per se of space and spatial objects would be that shape and extension are essentially features of mental states. The concept of spatial items which are not mental states would be a figment of the philosophical imagination. They would be radically imaginary, not just imaginary in the empirical sense.”

Sellars continues: “Kant obscures the justice of his characterization of Berkeley's position in the remark which follows, in which he claims that Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if space be interpreted as a property that belongs to things in themselves. For in that case, space and everything to which it serves as a condition, is a non-entity (B 274).

Here the direct connection with Berkeley is lost. But that is as it should be, for Kant is merely pointing out that one can arrive at the conclusion that the concept of actual spatial items other than mental states is incoherent by a route other than Berkeley's. For if space is a property which must belong to things in themselves, then, Kant has argued, there can be no such thing. Hence, given the classical interpretation of actuality as existence per se, it would follow that the concept of an actual spatial object is incoherent. And if the only alternative to hoping that space is a property of things in themselves were, as Berkeley thought it was, the view that spatial items are features of mental states, then the concept of actual spatial items which are not features of mental states would also be incoherent. We would be faced by a dilemma. Either space is by nature a thing in itself or a property of things in themselves or the spatial items which underlie our concepts of space and spatial items are (features of) mental states (sensations). On either alternative the concept of actual spatial items which are not mental states is incoherent.

Kant has prepared the way for an escape through the horns of this dilemma. He points out that the argument of the Aesthetic enables him to avoid the view that space is either a thing in itself or a property of things in themselves without agreeing with Berkeley that the concept of spatial items which are not mental states is incoherent.”

Sellars clearly argues that Kant’s position of problematic idealism is completely different than Berkeley’s position of dogmatic idealism. The difference between Kant’s system and Berkeley’s system is plainly illustrated through the arguments of both Morgan and Sellars. The accusation that Kant’s arguments are idealist in the sense that Berkeley’s arguments are idealist is plainly not correct. However, this is not to say that either Berkeley or Kant have non problematic philosophies.

G. E. Moore writes in “The Refutation of Idealism”: “…Now I think I am not mistaken in asserting that the reason why Idealists suppose that everything which is must be an inseparable aspect of some experience, is that they suppose some things, at least, to be inseparable aspects of their experience. And there is certainly nothing which they are so firmly convinced to be an inseparable aspect of their experience as what they call the content of their ideas and sensations. If, therefore, this turns out in every case, whether it be also the content or not, to be at least not an inseparable aspect of the experience of it, it will be readily admitted that nothing else which we experience ever is such an inseparable aspect. But if we never experience anything but what is not an inseparable aspect of that experience, how can we infer that anything whatever, let alone everything is an inseparable aspect of any experience? How utterly unfounded is the assumption that "esse is percipi" appears in the clearest light.”

Moore continues :”But further I think it may be seen that if the object of an Idealist's sensation were, as he supposes, not the object but merely the content of that sensation, if, that is to say, it really were an inseparable aspect of his experience, each Idealist could never be aware either of himself or of any other real thing. For the relation of a sensation to its object is certainly the same as that of any other instance of experience to its object; and this, I think, is generally admitted even by Idealists: they state as readily that what is judged or thought or perceived is the content of that judgment or thought or perception, as that blue is the content of the sensation of blue. But, if so, then when any Idealist thinks he is aware of himself or of any one else, this cannot really be the case. The fact is, on his own theory, that himself and that other person are in reality mere contents of an awareness, which is aware of nothing whatever. All that can be said is that there is an awareness in him, with a certain content: it can never be true that there is in him a consciousness of anything. And similarly he is never aware either of the fact that he exists or that reality is spiritual. The real fact, which he describes in those terms, is that his existence and the spirituality of reality are contents of an awareness, which is aware of nothing -- certainly not, then, of it own content.”

Moore argues: “ And further if everything, of which he thinks he is aware, is in reality merely a content of his own experience he has certainly no reason for holding that anything does exist except himself: it will, of course, be possible that other persons do exist; solipsism will not he necessarily true; but he can not possibly infer from anything he holds that it is not true. That he himself exists will of course follow from his premise that many things are contents of his experience. But since everything, of which he thinks himself aware, is in reality merely an inseparable aspect of that awareness; this premise allows no inference that any of these contents, far less any other consciousness, exists at all except as an inseparable aspect of his awareness, that is, as part of himself.”

Moore concludes: “Such, and not those which he takes to follow from it, are the consequences which do follow from the Idealist's supposition that the object of an experience is in reality merely a content or inseparable aspect of that experience. If, on the other hand, we clearly recognize the nature of that peculiar relation which I have called "awareness of anything"; if we see that this is involved equally in the analysis of every experience -- from the merest sensation to the most developed perception or reflexion, and that this is in fact the only essential element in an experience -- the only thing that is both common and peculiar to all experiences -- the only thing which gives us reason to call any fact mental; if, further, we recognize that this awareness is and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware: then it becomes plain that the existence of a table in space is related to my experience of it in precisely the same way as the existence of my own experience is related to my experience of that. Of both we are merely aware: if we are aware that the one exists, we are aware in precisely the same sense that the other exists; and if it is true that my experience can exist, even when I do not happen to be aware of its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the table can do so also. When, therefore, Berkeley, supposed that the only thing of which I am directly aware is my own sensations and ideas, he supposed what was false; and when Kant supposed that the objectivity of things in space consisted in the fact that they were "Vorstellungen" having to one another different relations from those which the same "Vorstellungen" have to one another in subjective experience, he supposed what was equally false. I am as directly aware of the existence of material things in space as of my own sensations, and what I am aware of with regard to each is exactly the same -- namely that in one case the material thing, and in the other case my sensation does really exist. The question requiring to be asked about material things is thus not: What reason have we for supposing that anything exists corresponding to our sensations? but: What reason have we for supposing that material things do not exist, since their existence has precisely the same evidence as that of our sensations? That either exist may be false; but if it is a reason for doubting the existence of matter, that it is an inseparable aspect of our experience, the same reasoning will prove conclusively that our experience does not exist either, since that must also be an inseparable aspect of our experience of it. The only reasonable alternative to the admission that matter exists as well as spirit, Is absolute Skepticism -- that, as likely as not nothing exists at all. All other suppositions -- the Agnostic's, that something, at all events, does exist, as much as the Idealist's, that spirit does -- are, if we have no reason for believing in matter, as baseless as the grossest superstitions.”

It is the case that Kant’s systematic argument refuting dogmatic idealism has fundamental differences with the dogmatic idealism. Kant’s being accused of being an idealist ala Berkeley has been shown to be an empty charge. Kant and Berkeley have totally different systems of philosophy to describe the empirical world. Berkeley claims that the empirical world does not exist as anything but mental representations. Kant claims that the empirical world exists independently of human perception regardless of human perceptions. Berkeley assumes that everything exists as part of one all perceiving god and that nothing exists outside of the perceptions. Kant assumes that everything exists as permanent existing things upon which to base perceptions of change. The leap of faith that Berkeley takes is the existence of his all perceiving god. The leap of faith that Kant makes is the existence of empirical objects. The question is not whether Kant and Berkeley had radically different systems of philosophy, but it should be, as Moore argued, whether or not Kant and Berkeley had taken similar leaps of faith.

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

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