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Is Altruism Possible in Epicurean and Stoic Ethics?
By: Dr. Tamela Ice

IS ALTRUISM POSSIBLE IN EPICUREAN AND STOIC ETHICS?

INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I will investigate the extent to which Epicureanism and Stoicism allow for altruistic actions – actions undertaken in order to benefit another, regardless of any benefit or sacrifice to oneself. I will consider the question presented by Julia Annas of whether altruism presents problems for the Epicureans and Stoics in terms of their conception of the final end. In considering whether Epicureanism is as altruistic as some claim, I will look at Epicurus’ emphasis on the importance of friendship and show that altruistic actions are ultimately a means to one’s own end. Similarly, in considering the Stoic emphasis on attaining a state of impartiality for all, including oneself, I will claim that the reason for performing altruistic actions is to benefit the agent in attaining his or her final end. Moreover, the impartiality of Stoicism leads one away from a concern for others in the way altruism demands. Thus, for both the Epicureans and the Stoics the extent to which altruistic actions are allowed is the extent to which they benefit the agent.

BACKGROUND
It is generally understood that ethics for Epicurus and the Stoics is, as with their predecessors, self-referential. As R. W. Sharples explains, the basic ethical question for both Epicureans and Stoics is not “’what sort of actions are right?’ but ‘what sort of person should I be?’ or ‘what life-style policies should I adopt?’” The agent’s concern about how to live is primarily self-focused. Yet, there are those, including Sharples, who attempt to downplay the egoistic tone of Hellenistic ethics. For example, Sharples says that the emphasis on the self is not to be understood unfavorably, as being “inconsiderate and lacking in humanity.” Indeed, according to Sharples, it may encourage people to act in the interests of others if the motivation is that it is in one’s own best interest as well. Thus the emphasis is no longer how the agent can live a good life, but in providing a reason for altruistic actions.
Another example comes from Norman Wentworth DeWitt who tells us that it is a “mistake to think of Epicurus as an egoistic hedonist, ruled by self-interest. He was an altruistic hedonist.”

A.A. Long claims that Stoicism both Kant and Christianity are greatly influenced by the Stoic doctrines. According to Long, the Kantian and Christian duties are easily derived from Stoicism. It is not difficult to see that Kant and Christianity advocate a type of impartial altruism.

Finally, Julia Annas says:

"As has been stressed … the entry point to ancient ethical reflection is an assessment of one’s own life and the way it is going, and ethical thought is
thought about how to reorder one’s life in a reflective way. It has (far too) often been thought that because of this shaping fact ancient ethics is egoistic. For if I am concerned to achieve my own final end, improve my own life, am I not simply seeking my own self-interest?"

Annas responds with an emphatic ‘no.’ Annas says that it is not the agent’s self-interest that is to be developed, but the moral virtues. The virtues of justice and friendship are concerned with the good of others “which may involve my surrendering goods I want to others … all the virtues are dispositions to do the right thing, where this is established in ways that are independent of my own interests.” Annas goes on to say:

"… the fact that I aim at my own final end makes ancient ethics formally
agent-centered or self-centered, but does not make it self-centered in content … Achieving my final good, happiness, whatever that turns out to be, will involve furthering the good of others. For first, I have no reason, just because of seeking my own good, to treat others in ways that are instrumental to my own good. Second, a virtuous person is committed just by being virtuous to respecting and sometimes furthering the good of others. And third, it is a fact of experience that we do care about the good of other people in a non-instrumental way, even when this is not a direct requirement of virtue … "

Annas then claims that an ethical theory that starts with an emphasis on the final end for the agent, or agent-centered ethics, does not necessarily disallow an interest in others for their own sake. Annas says “There is nothing egoistic about the assumption that ethical reflection starts from the agent’s coming to reassess his life as a whole.” Annas does concede, however, that some of the ancient (i.e., Hellenistic) ethical theories have conceptions of the final end that seem to create problems as to how one can be altruistic without being concerned with how such actions affect the agent. In the remainder of this paper I will present Annas’ account of the extent to which Epicureanism and Stoicism can allow for altruistic actions.

EPICURUS

Insofar as Epicurus discourages participation in politics and marriage seems to be a “take it or leave it” kind of relationship, if altruistic actions are promoted at all in Epicurus it seems that it will be in the realm of friendship. As Annas notes, “Genuine friendship implies a willingness to pledge oneself to activities which are unrewarding for oneself, for one’s friends’ sake.” Indeed, there are passages that can be considered as supportive of altruistic actions toward friends in Epicureanism. For example, in The Principle Doctrines of Epicurus (10.139-154), Diogenes Laertius says at XVII, “Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one’s whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.”

Another example of Epicurus’ high regard for friendship is in The Vatican Collection of Epicurean Sayings such as the following:

23. Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its
origin from the benefits [it confers on us].
60. Let us share our friend’s suffering not with laments but with
thoughtful concern.
78. The noble man is most involved with wisdom and friendship, of which
one is a mortal good, the other immortal.

A final example of how Epicureanism may be understood to promote altruism comes from Cicero’s On Ends (1.66-70). Cicero presents the Epicurean spokesman, Torquatus, as explaining the Epicurean view of friendship. According to Torquatus (in Cicero’s interpretation), “we rejoice in our friends’ joy as much as in our own and are equally pained by their distress. The wise man, therefore, will have just the same feelings towards his friend that he has for himself, and he will work as much for his friend’s pleasure as he would for his own.”

These examples of the importance of friendship in Epicurean thought are not exhaustive, but they will suffice to illustrate how Epicureanism may be read as altruistic. However, when we consider the final end for Epicurus and other passages about friendship, the extent of altruism becomes somewhat paradoxical.

For Epicurus, the final end is pleasure. Annas says “pleasure in the role of final good is a kind of tranquility.” For Epicurus, the individual’s final end must be complete, that is, the final end includes a state of tranquility and self-sufficiency. For Epicurus there are two kinds of pleasure, kinetic and static (or katastematic). As Annas notes, an example of kinetic pleasure is drinking when one is thirsty. It is the satisfaction of a physical pain or need. The static (katastematic) pleasure is the mental tranquility that comes after having drunk. Our final end, according to Epicurus, is the attainment of static pleasure, or tranquility. According to Annas, “Epicurus is expanding the notion of pleasure … so that living virtuously is part of what living pleasantly is.” Briefly, if our final end is to be complete, and pleasure is our final end, then pleasure must be complete. A complete life involves seeking those things which are virtuous, things we seek for their own sake. Thus, static pleasure must include living virtuously. As Annas explains, such a life must include friendship “For having a friend is like living virtuously – it is something we do for its own sake.” Thus, for Epicurus, or so it seems, “a life aimed at pleasure can include [friendship], just as it can include the practice of the virtues.”

It appears that genuine friendship, which is by its nature altruistic, is necessary for attaining the final end in Epicurus. However, there are passages that make the connection between such friendship and one’s own final end somewhat paradoxical. To return to The Vatican Collection of Epicurean Sayings for a moment, recall that in number 23, the origin of friendship is found in the benefit to the agent. Number 56-57 says “The wise man feels no more pain when he is tortured than when his friend is tortured, and will die on his behalf; for if he betrays his friend, his entire life will be confounded and utterly upset because of a lack of confidence.”

This passage, on the one hand, emphasizes concern for the friend to the extent that one would die for one’s friend. Yet, the last line is more concerned with the effects of betrayal on the agent. Another passage, quoted in Annas will clarify the paradoxical nature of altruism in Epicurus as it is concerned with friendship.

"[The Epicureans] claim that friendship cannot be separated from pleasure, just like the virtues, which have been discussed. Isolation and a life without friends are full of hidden traps and fears, so that reason itself advises us to secure freindships; when these are obtained our spirits are strengthened and cannot be parted from the hope of getting pleasures. Just as hate, jealousy and contempt stand in the way of pleasures, so friendships are not merely the most loyal aids to pleasures but also their producers, both for one’s friends and for oneself. One enjoys them in the present, and is also inspired with hope for the following and future time. So, since we cannot in any way keep a firm and continuing pleasantness in life without friendship, and since we cannot have friendship itself unless we love our friends equally with ourselves – this is in fact brought about in friendship, and friendship is linked with pleasure. For we are equally glad along with our friends’ gladness, and suffer equally in their troubles. And so the wise person will feel the same towards his friend as he does himself, and will, on account of his friend’s pleasure, undertake the same efforts that he would on account of his own. The same things should be said about friendship that were said about the virtues, how they are always connected with pleasures. Epicurus said it wonderfully in almost these words: ‘The same belief that strengthened our spirits not to fear either eternal or lengthy evil, has discerned that in this space of our life it is the protection of friendship which is the most secure."

The duality of this passage is clear. On the side of altruism, the passage emphasizes that we care for hour friends as we do ourselves and that we are as concerned for their pleasure as for our own. However, on the side of a more egoistic, self-concerned point of view, the passage stresses the benefits of friendship for the agent. Friendship provides the agent with security in meeting everyday needs. Moreover, friendship helps alleviate fears and anxieties. The value in friendship, then, is not because the friend has intrinsic worth, but in the assurance of utility to the agent. As The Vatican Collection of Epicurean Sayings (34) says, “We do not need utility from our friends so much as we need confidence concerning that utility.” This suggests that friends are, to some degree, necessary in assisting the agent in the pursuit of her final end, a state of tranquility.

Lucretius, in his On the Nature of the Universe Book V, lends support to the notion that friendship is for the benefit of the agent. In this section, Lucretius discusses Epicurus’ theory of the evolution of civilization. Briefly, for Epicurus, social interaction has no intrinsic value and we have no social instincts. Our only concern is with our own pleasure. Humans came to realize that forming agreements with others would provide some security from nature and other humans. Friendship does not come about because we value others for themselves, but because it is in our best interest to establish friendships.

The scale is thus tipping toward the side of egoism.

Annas suggests that what Epicurus needs in order to consider altruistic actions as intrinsically valuable is a two-level view similar to that of modern utilitarianism. On such a view “pleasure is our aim when we are thinking of the policy as a whole; but it is not our aim in individual acts of friendship, which are aimed at the friend’s good for its own sake.” However, as Annas also points out, Epicurus rejects the two-level notion. An Epicurean saying, quoted in Annas, supports the view that friendship, and what appears to be an altruistic attitude toward others, is ultimately agent-centered. This passage says:

"If you do not on every suitable occasion refer each of your actions to the end given by nature, but stop short and make your avoidance or choice with reference to something else, your actions will not be consistent with your theories."

This passage, according to Annas, “rules out the kind of two-level view needed to make all Epicurus’ claims about friendship and pleasure consistent. It seems to imply that in every act of friendship I should be asking myself, not about the welfare of my friend, but directly about my own final end, pleasure.” Annas says that even if Epicurus allowed for a two-level view with regard to altruism (other-concern) and agent-centered concern, this “would involve a kind of schizophrenia. While helping my friend I would bear in mind only my friend’s needs, while with another part of my mind remaining aware that the point of all this activity in the first place was simply to obtain pleasure for me.”

It does not appear that Epicurus’ theory of the final end can allow for the degree of altruistic actions demanded by genuine friendship. As Annas notes, “Epicurus can generate other-concern, but not enough other-concern for the agent to be prepared to accept great losses for the sake of other people … such relationships would seem to be irrational; attachment to the person has come quite detached from concern about the agent’s own pleasure.” Thus, the relationship between friendship and the agent’s own final end, pleasure, is not what it seems. Moreover, Annas’ initial claim that the content of ancient ethical theories is altruistic does not appear accurate.

The next issue to be addressed is the extent to which Stoicism allows for altruistic actions. As with the section on Epicurus, I will focus mainly on Annas.

Stoics

Using Annas as a model, I will look at the role of altruism in Stoic ethics by considering the Stoic theory of familiarization, or oikeiosis. As Annas explains this, familiarization is a three-term relationship: X makes Y familiar to Z. For the Stoics, X is nature which (a) familiarizes one with himself; and (b) familiarizes one person with other humans. Annas provides the following passage from Diogenes to illustrate the idea behind nature familiarizing an individual to himself:

"The primary impulse an animal has, they say, is to preserving itself, since
from the start nature familiarizes it with itself, as Chrysippus says in Aims Book 1, where he calls familiar to every animal its own constitution and its consciousness of this. For it is not likely that nature would make an animal alien [to itself], nor that having produced it nature would make it neither alien to nor familiar with itself; for in this way it repulses what is harmful and accepts what is familiar to it. But as for what some say, that pleasure is what animals’ primary impulse is for, this they show to be false. Pleasure, they say, of there actually is any, is something that supervenes when nature itself has sought and found what fits the thing’s constitution – like good condition in animals and flourishing plants."

As Chrysippus points out, if we were, by nature, alienated or indifferent to ourselves we would not have survived. Thus, “we have a natural impulse to preserve and to care about ourselves.” For the Stoics, then, we have a natural tendency toward self-concern. However, as Annas says, according to (b), nature also familiarizes us with others. Thus, familiarization is also a natural tendency toward altruism (or other-concern). To illustrate this tendency toward altruism, Annas relates the Stoic developmental theory, which is common in Hellenistic sources. As infants, we have a primitive interest in ourselves. We learn what we are to do to secure those things which are natural to us – food, shelter, security. We develop rational abilities to follow rules and shape a virtuous disposition. Finally, if we have developed properly, we realize that the reasons for acting are more important than the effects of acting for particular reasons.

Because we have a natural tendency toward others, as well as for ourselves, we develop feelings of concern for our offspring, “and from there extend our sympathies outwards to concern for others. Once we have started to do this, we find that there is no rational stopping place until we have concern for every human just insofar as he or she is human.” As Annas clarifies, this type of impartiality does not allow for the kind of genuine friendship talked about in Epicurus. Indeed, this impartiality does not allow for any type of close attachment to a particular person. Thus, the concern cannot be for the other in and of himself. According to the Stoics, the attachment, limited as it is, to other people “is only an early stage in our development towards a fully impartial view of others and ourselves. We have no ethical reason to stop at, or to be particularly concerned with, attachments to particular people.”
According to Annas, the final end for the Stoics, as is the case with Epicureans, is a state of tranquility. Attaining a state of impartiality toward others and oneself is the means of achieving that end. This emphasis on impartiality suggests that friendship cannot be important for the Stoics. The question is, then, is altruism anything more than a transient, developmental stage?

Annas says that the Stoic “’wise person’ … will recognize the crucial difference between moral and other value, and will be prepared to act on reasons that reflect this, reasons which do not further his own desires and projects … the virtuous person … will benefit all equally, as well as himself.”
It may seem that the impartiality demanded by Stoicism is unrealistic, “too much of an alienation from our natural attachments.” According to Annas, the Stoic response is to re-emphasize that attachments are a part of the human development, with impartiality being the goal. Some may argue that such impartiality is psychologically impossible. However, as quoted in Annas, Hierocles (a later Stoic) provides what might serve as a “psychological mechanism for getting from limited other-concern to impartial moral concern for all.” I will give only a part of Hierocles’ passage, which should suffice for the present purposes.

In general each of us is as it were circumscribed by many circles, some smaller, some larger, some enclosing and others enclosed, depending on their differing and unequal relations to one another. The first and nearest circle is the one which a person had drawn around his own mind as around a centre; in this circle is included the body and things got for the body’s sake … Second … is the one in which are placed parents siblings, wife and children. Third is the one in which are uncles and aunts, grandfathers and grandmothers, siblings’ children and also cousins. Next the circle including other relatives. And next the one including fellow-demesmen; then the one of fellow-tribesmen; then the one of fellow-citizens and then in the same way the circle of people from towns nearby and the circle of people of the same ethnic group. The furthest and largest, which includes all the circles, is that of the whole human race.

The point is that the further from oneself others are, the less attachment one has. The task for the Stoic is to attempt to equalize the altruistic feelings for all by pulling the circle closer. Ultimately, one should have no more concern for one’s parents than for other, more distant relatives. Similarly, the impartiality at the family level should be extended to the entire human race. This is problematic for the notion of altruism in Stoicism. One is not extending the concern one has for those in the innermost circles to those further away. The attachments one initially feels towards those one is closely related to becomes impartial and thus other-concern is diluted. That is, the impartiality for those in the outermost circles is brought into the innermost circles. It would seem that if the Stoic were to be consistent, altruistic actions would have to be extended to all or none. It is not possible, with impartiality toward all, to act in a way that is beneficial to some or one particular person.

Given the Stoic developmental theory it seems as though self-concern is primary, other-concern is a stage in one’s development that does not lead to altruism, but a decline in self-concern. Thus, Stoicism allows for altruistic actions to the extent that they ultimately lead to the elimination of self-concern – a means to an end.

CONCLUSION

For Epicureans, altruistic actions appear to be irrational and limited to the extent to which they are beneficial to the agent. For Stoicism, altruistic actions seem to be an odd, transient phase people go through because of their nature. Altruism is not something people try to develop, it just happens as a result of being human. The goal is to transcend the natural and become impartial towards all. Annas’ claim that the content of ancient (Hellenistic) ethical theories is altruistic is, at best, problematic. It would seem that the opposite is true. The form of Epicureanism and Stoicism lends itself to an altruistic reading, while the content shows this to be otherwise.

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

Sharples, R. W. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 82. Ibid., p. 84. Ibid. DeWitt, Norman Wentworth. Epicurus and His Philosophy. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973, p. 8. A. A.Long. Hellenistic Philosophy Stoics, Epicurus, Sceptics. London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, 1974, p. 107. Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 223. Annas refers to the Hellenistic philosophers as ‘ancient’ philosophers. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 227. Ibid., p. 242. Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory Readings Second Edition. Translated by Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997, p. 34. Ibid., pp. 36-39. Long, A. A. & Sedley, D. N. The Hellenistic philosophers Volume 1 Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 132. Annas, p. 224. Ibid., p. 238. Ibid., p. 239. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 37. Lucretius. On the Nature of the Universe. Translated by Ronald Melville. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 168. Annas, p. 240. Ibid., p. 241. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 243. Ibid., p. 262. Diogenes VII 85-6, quoted in Annas, p. 263. Annas, p. 263. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 265. Ibid. Ibid., p. 266. Ibid., p. 267. Ibid. Ibid.

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