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First Principles/Part Two
By: textman

The Question of Primacy & Supremacy

In the past, philosophers have emphasized one or another of these three sources of knowledge (senses, reason, memory), and today it is the scientists who lead the way in doing likewise. Psychologists and sociologists stress mind and personal experience; Empiricists stress matter and sense data. Rationalists stress logic and systems. And radical sceptics are still able to doubt them all. And so on and so forth. It basically all comes down to a simple (and logically prior) value-judgment. Which of these sources has primacy? Which of the three is supreme? For the sceptics doubt is surely supreme over all; thus there is simply no reasoning with them. Others place their hope and faith in other things. Bertrand Russell sought certainty in the Platonic realm between mathematics and logic, and was quite disappointed to be left unable to find it there after all. It's all very odd, to be sure, but if we substitute our less material trinity for the more traditional one, then the question of primacy takes on a rather different character.

Perception, Philosophy, History. Which of these three is supreme, eh? THAT is the question! In trying to decide this matter it would be well to first reflect upon the notion that philosophy IS its history. Philosophy, especially Western Philosophy, is a long series of progressions and developments that build on prior discoveries and achievements. Knock Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel out of the picture, and the entire structure of modern philosophy comes crashing down like a house of cards! From all this we can conclude that Philosophy easily resolves itself into History (in the same way that Science resolves into Philosophy), such that the question of primacy becomes one of choosing between Perception and History. And in *this* form the 'which-is-supreme' question is finally seen for what it truly is; namely, nonsense, for there is obviously no point in choosing between Perception and History. Both are *equally* primary and necessary for ALL human being.

Again all this resolves into a matter of first principles: Don't make hasty and unnecessary value-judgments that are sure to lead you down the garden path to less certainty while all-the-while promising more and greater certainty. If we can learn to *consistently* stay within the fluid bounds of reasonable-doubt then we can affirm that knowledge is a complex combination of ALL the sources available to human being. Indeed it is a natural product of the co-creative interaction (and even inter-dependence) between awareness and cosmos.

Descartes' Great Grandson

I declared above that modern philosophy would collapse if we knocked out just a few philosophical superstars. I would now like to demonstrate philosophy's dependence upon history with just one example: Bertrand Russell. Now Lord Russell is quite possibly the most important and influential philosopher of the 20th century. And one of the chief reasons why he holds this exalted position is, I think, because he is among the very few philosophers who are readable among the general public. It's true, most philosophical documents can only be stomached by "professional" philosophers (i.e. professors and sophists); but Russell is widely recognized for the clarity and precision of his writings, as well as for their (equally important) readability. The reason why this is so, and also why it is important to us, is not just because Russell is an outstanding writer, but also because it is essentially a key element in his philosophical method. So Russell's favoured method of doing philosophy can be called 'logical analysis'; and the *way* he writes is largely an emanation (for lack of a better word) of this method. Indeed the two are so closely united in perfect harmony that it would be utter nonsense to even talk about one without ever mentioning the other.

Anyway, the point is that Russell is a fine heir-apparent to the Great Doubter, Rene Descartes; and we shall see why very soon. Russell's literary output, over the course of a long and active life, was immense (so as to rival even that of the Great Asimov); so I can't claim to have read everything he wrote. Nevertheless I think his history of philosophy is his best work. But perhaps this is merely an arbitrary and unjustified (not to say biased) value-judgment on my part. However, for our purposes here and now, another portion of his scribblings is far more pertinent and to the point. In 1927 Russell released a fine little masterpiece entitled 'An Outline of Philosophy'. Of this book the most interesting page - by far! - is the contents page, which basically sets forth Russell's vision of what Philosophy is, what it does, and what its for. For those of you unfortunate enough to go through life without ever having seen this awesome gem of a philosophy book, I suppose I'll just have to enlighten you by reproducing it here and now (minus the page numbers) so that you can see for yourself why I say such foolish things:

The Contents Page of 'An Outline of Philosophy'

1. Philosophic Doubts
PART I: MAN FROM WITHOUT
2. Man and his Environment
3. The Process of Learning in Animals and Infants
4. Language
5. Perception Objectively Regarded
6. Memory Objectively Regarded
7. Inference as a Habit
8. Knowledge Behaviouristically Considered
PART II: THE PHYSICAL WORLD
9. The Structure of the Atom
10. Relativity
11. Causal Laws in Physics
12. Physics and Perception
13. Physical and Perceptual Space
14. Perception and Physical Causal Laws
15. The Nature of our Knowledge of Physics
PART III: MAN FROM WITHIN
16. Self-observation
17. Images
18. Imagination and Memory
19. The Introspective Analysis of Perception
20. Consciousness?
21. Emotion, Desire, and Will
22. Ethics
PART IV: THE UNIVERSE
23. Some Great Philosophies of the Past
24. Truth and Falsehood
25. The Validity of Inference
26. Events, Matter, and Mind
27. Man's Place in the Universe

Well! How about that? It certainly *looks* as if Philosophy has itself a nice full plate doesn't it? And, of course, you can modify and elaborate upon this basic scheme any which way you'd care to. And many have done just that, believe me. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I guess. Anyway, getting back to the matter at hand, we can easily see that the sections most relevant to our current deliberations are some chapters in parts one, two, and four, and almost all of part three. And that says a lot in itself, but, sadly, we are unable to do a thorough examination and analysis of the entire book here; and not even just those many chapters that have a stronger bearing upon our current topic. This is most unfortunate, to be sure; but we can hardly part with Russell without taking at least a small peek at that curious first chapter concerning philosophic doubts.

Neo-Sophia: Science's Handmaiden

Now Philosophy, according to Bertie, is about answering those doubts that are raised by problems that Science cannot answer, and that Religion does not (usually) address (i.e. in a sensible way). Answering such doubts would therefore be a vital, perhaps even primary, goal for Philosophy. Regardless of any methods involved, the value of Philosophy is obvious: its value is the exact equivalent of Science; that is, Science and Philosophy both share the same value by doing pretty much the same thing (i.e. increasing our knowledge by answering questions and doubts), and that value is found chiefly in their utility! Science is very useful to all kinds of people, not just to scientists. Philosophy is also useful. She too answers questions and addresses doubts. Indeed, Philosophy is very like unto a special-science really; it has its own jargon and methods, its own technical terms and universal concepts, and even the very same need to 'get it all down on paper'.

All this is quite true and as it should be, and it's all good too. Moreover, this pragmatic vision of Philosophy accomplishes two very important things: (1) it expands the horizons of philosophic subject matter to the very edge of the cosmos (and maybe even beyond), AND it also (2) gives Philosophy a clear purpose, a strong sense of direction, and a much needed capacity to *focus*. Curiosity, doubt, the relentless quest for knowledge, the drive to explore every nook and cranny in the entire cosmos ... All these things drive and empower Philosophy as it marches triumphant through the centuries. Hey, don't get me wrong here. I have no real objections against this role and vision of Philosophy as a model of pragmatic utility. After all, it's still a thousand times better than being Theology's handmaiden! No, no objections … except maybe one. And maybe just a small one at that. It's that bit about doubt being logically prior to knowledge and philosophy. For some reason that notion just sticks in my craw.

But: "Philosophy arises from an unusually obstinate attempt to arrive at real knowledge" (1). Philosophy intends to generate true knowledge of all reality. From this we can easily conclude that as far as Philosophy is concerned, Reality is Supreme. Reality IS the Supreme Being, the Absolute Actuality, the Atomic Source of All Things Material & Immaterial. Philosophy wants to know all about Reality. That is its will and purpose and goal and reason-for-being. While common-knowledge is defective in many ways, real-knowledge has power, precision, and utility. Real knowledge is accurate, consistent, lacks arrogance, and always aims for comprehensiveness (for Philosophy embraces all knowledge, and seeks to make a harmony of the whole). Another job for Philosophy is to attack any confusion that may arise from errors in common-sense beliefs. Russell then pauses to explain that although Philosophy is an exclusively intellectual business, nevertheless it "may have bearings upon matters lying outside the sphere of pure intellect" (1). Bearings, eh? Well, I for one was kinda hoping for something a little more substantial than mere bearings, but I guess we'll just have to take whatever we're given!

Philosophy: the Eternal Champion

Then comes an important observation: "Vagueness, in particular, belongs, in some degree, to all human thinking; we can diminish it indefinitely, but we can never abolish it wholly" (2). This is so important because it means that vagueness is built, not into the machinery of the brain so much, but rather into the very form and structure and essence of sapience itself. How could it be otherwise when Russell specifically mentions "all human thinking"? And this also means that vagueness is an eternal fountain of those doubts and errors and defects that Philosophy is specifically designed to combat. It would thus appear that Philosophy is eternally engaged in battle with the forces of darkness, confusion, and ignorance. An eternally *losing* battle (I should add), since it is one that can never be ended, let alone won. Can you believe it? This warfare is NOT what I signed up for! In terms of utility alone, this vital conflict within the very soul of knowledge attacks the core value of Philosophy (as Russell envisions it). Who is the winner, and who the loser in *that* eternal conflict? Russell does not tell us. But he does point out that Philosophy is also eternal process; what he calls "a continuing activity, not something in which we can achieve final perfection once for all … final truth belongs to heaven, not to this world" (2-3). I agree that the quest for knowledge is endless, and I agree that grand ideological schemes and philosophical systems are in error whenever they claim to contain all human knowledge (i.e. all true knowledge of Reality), but I don't think it's too much to ask for just a FEW final truths to cling to in these bleak and stormy seas of Russell's philosophy. After all, the statement that 'vagueness can never be abolished' certainly sounds pretty damn FINAL to me! :)

Much Ado About Coffee

Having thus set the stage for eternal, cosmic battle between the righteous forces of Science & Philosophy and the vile (but obviously very powerful) forces of doubt and ignorance, Russell proposes to get on with 'the business of philosophy' by first examining "the three defects", starting with "the belief in common objects, such as tables and chairs and trees" (3). Russell says that the "first intrusion of doubt" occurs here. He says that the confidence of "naïve common sense" is undermined if we "admit that the object is not what we see". But why on earth should we want to make such an absurd admission? Because "they do not appear exactly alike to any two simultaneous observers". Russell means that if I'm standing here (in the kitchen) holding a cup of coffee, and you're at the far end of the dining room, then this cup is going to look very different to you than it does to me. I have to look straight down almost, and I can see the coffee inside it, while you may not be able to see the coffee at all. But you can see the steam rising above the rim, so you can easily assume the existence of said coffee, even though you can't directly perceive it with any of your senses.

In point of fact, the cup of coffee is actually giving off two very different sets of sense-data; one set goes to me (i.e. I can smell the coffee, and feel the warmth of the cup in my hand, etc), and a much diminished set of sense-data goes to you. Two different sets of sense-data suggests two different sources or two different objects from whence they originated. That's logic for you. Logic can't even tell if my cup of coffee is one thing or two things! If this example of the defects of naïve common sense illustrates anything, it illustrates the defects of a top-heavy reliance upon logic. Who said my cup of coffee isn't supposed to give off more than one sense-data set at the same time? And who, for that matter, said that my perception of my cup of coffee is a BELIEF in the first place? Not me. Not you. Russell and his sceptical predecessors did, that's who.

But in Reality I KNOW my cup of coffee is real (and actually exists) because I can, and do, feel, see, smell, touch, and taste it. Moreover, you know it's real too, even though you can barely see it from way over there. So Russell's philosopher-observers obviously have a lot less common sense than what you and I have. Is this a pity? Yeah … for them! It's pretty clear now that Russell is running around in tight logical circles for the purpose of creating doubt where in fact none exists. Naïve common sense is a lot tougher than Russell cares to give it credit for … And we can also plainly see that Russell's "first intrusion of doubt" is nothing but a sham. And worse still: Russell's philosophy has just failed its first test of utility; the very thing it bases its value upon. Our knowledge of real-world objects and entities is not defective so much as limited; but in creating doubts where there need not be any, Russell has shown that his philosophy IS defective, and in a very fundamental way.

How Brain Works?

Russell then goes on to say that there are also problems with seeing a chair (which he likes to call 'a patch of colour'), and that when philosophers observe the process of someone seeing a chair, it raises many questions and doubts. Logical analysis of this event shows us that "the pursuit of precision destroys certainty" (4). Why? Because naïve common sense makes many assumptions about a chair; assumptions that are NOT contained within the sense-data packet that our brains receive from perception. Yet these assumptions are really more like concepts: (1) Causality, (2) Substance, (3) Permanence, and what Russell calls (4) "the power to cause sensations". Russell also says that our knowledge of the true nature of the chair (i.e. atomic) is an inference made when you combine sensations with the concepts / assumptions listed above; which Russell calls 'metaphysical beliefs'. Here we see echoes of Hume, and especially Kant (with his a-priori categories). Well, I'm not at all sure if these odd metaphysical beliefs and assumptions are intended to create and multiply problems and doubts, but it's a 100% certainty that Hume and Kant do indeed create and multiply problems and doubts!

Now I don't mean to come off sounding like I'm arbitrarily dismissing these giants among philosophers. There remains still a lot to be learned from the writings of men like Descartes, Hume, and Kant - as much from their errors and mistakes as from their triumphs and achievements. If it were at all otherwise, then they would not be so important to the development and history of modern philosophy. Nuff said.

The Significance of Documents

Russell then points out the rather obvious fact that memory and testimony are not only "essential to science", but are both "open to criticism by the sceptic" (5). Of course, it would be irrational not to acknowledge that memory and testimony are flawed instruments at best; but Russell claims that rationality itself demands "a less complete confidence in our original beliefs than we had before". Here again precision destroys certainty; or at least knocks it down a notch or two. But again I must object. Frankly, I fail to see why Russell is making such a fuss about this. After all, we all know that memory and testimony are sometimes wrong, and under certain conditions (egg. intoxication) are even prone to error. And these dangers are especially biting in the case of careless and undisciplined minds. All true. And that is WHY we also make use of various documents and written testimonies (legal or otherwise). Writing our thoughts down on paper (or computer file) in a sense freezes and preserves them (imperfectly), such that they can endure through time (imperfectly), even when no one is actually reading / thinking them. In other words, documents can restore most of the confidence that Russell says is here lost to us; thus once again his doubts turn out to be bogus (from the logical AND common-sense perspective).

On the Primacy of Words

Anyway, after spending a few pages solidifying his position regarding memory and testimony, Russell turns his attention to the problem of introspection: "Many philosophers have held that introspection gave the most indubitable of all knowledge" (8). Russell counters this notion by observing that the difference between perception and introspection "seems to me to be connected, not with what is primary in our knowledge, but with what is inferred". If Russell here means by 'inferred' something like 'what one is thinking', then we tend to agree. He soon goes on to make another significant observation: "There is thus something subjective and private about what we take to be external perception …". Here again we tend to agree. Then he declares that believing is a form of feeling. Meanings and images are not really accurate representations "of the logical content" of any philosophical proposition (9). "It is only when you come to expressing your thought in words that you approach logical precision. Both in introspection and in external perception, we try to express what we know in words". Once again we tend to agree. Words are indeed the basic building blocks of all human knowledge. And more important even than this is the fact (Russell would say 'belief') that language is the basic repository of all forms of knowledge. This is because language is obviously bigger than any single mind. As is society, culture, history, and especially Reality and Cosmos. Language is something that many minds build and share and use; as is everything else on that list we just gave.

Introspection & Perception Not so Different

Therefore Reality (as we know it) is a shared-reality; and so the individual mind necessarily has certain undeniable limits; limits which the sceptical tradition strives to increase. No single mind has the capacity to encompass and contain all the knowledge that is committed to writing; let alone all the knowledge that is (or potentially is) available; let alone all the knowledge that we are as yet ignorant of. And this little observation (or inference (or conclusion)) effectively demonstrates that solipsism is fundamentally flawed by way of being excessively irrational. Solipsism is basically doubt gone mad. Russell accordingly turns his attention to the "social aspect of knowledge". Perceptions and thoughts are both expressed by these common and shared words and ideas. Thus, there "seems no reason to regard introspection as a different *kind* of knowledge from external perception" (10). And indeed they shouldn't be so regarded, for both processes take place within the confines of that same inferno of inference and subjectivity, the human mind.

Anyway, Russell concludes with the idea that as far as veracity (or trustworthiness) goes, introspection and perception are pretty much the same logically; which means that they both suffer from the same defects. For example: words can't describe any given event "in all its particularity; all words, even proper names, are general …" (10). Which is just to say that words are not precise enough, or accurate enough, or logical enough, to show (or describe) Reality in all its awesome fullness and complexity. Thus the inferences we make in both introspection and perception "may be mistaken". Inferences are assumptions or suppositions or beliefs that are partly caused by sense-data, partly by memories of previous events (i.e. "past experience"), and partly by reflex or habit. Obviously people have very little conscious control over such a complex and subtle process.

Russell even suggests that some inferences may be physiological in origin. But these kinds of inferences can be fooled or tricked by things such as mirrors and dreams, and so we have ample room to doubt them, if only "for the sake of self-consistency". It's true; unproved inferences and assumptions form a large part of our perception and thinking. This means that doubt is logically valid in both cases; but just because logic admits the possibility of error doesn't mean that it is reasonable to do so *without* just cause. If I see a chair across the room, is it sensible for me to say 'I may be mistaken about this observation because my memories may be flawed, or because my assumptions are logically unproven, or because it's possible that my senses are being fooled'? I would answer 'no', because 999 times out a thousand I would be right in *believing* that a chair really does actually exist right over there!

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

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