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Dawkins and the Selfish Gene: Just a Matter of Perspective?
By: Mitchell

Dawkins’ Theory of the Selfish Gene was first explained in his 1976 work The Selfish Gene, which has, since then, attracted numerous outspoken detractors as well as supporters amongst scientists and philosophers alike. In this essay I will be looking at the nature of the Selfish Gene and asking both why Dawkins would propose such a seemingly ridiculous and potentially controversial idea as well as how well it holds philosophically and scientifically.

The idea of the Selfish Gene is, in many ways, a simple frame shifting from our normal view of biological organisms and reproduction. Dawkins says that the primary unit of reproduction should not be thought to be the organism but to the gene instead. Dawkins himself describes this new interpretation of the role of the gene in the introduction to The Selfish Gene,

“We are Survival Machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.” Dawkins 1976 p. X

What, then, is the individual organism – the unit which, until Dawkins has taken primacy in our understanding of ourselves, of animals and of biology. Dawkins feels that we need a ‘frame-shift’ namely a movement from one angle or looking at things to another and this shift, he suggests, should be towards the gene, not the individual, as the unit of interest.

“Genetically speaking, individuals and groups are like clouds in the sky or dust – storms in the desert. They are temporary aggregations or federations. They are not stable though evolutionary time (whereas the gene) does not grow senile. It leaps from body to body in its own way and for its own ends… the genes are the immortals.” Dawkins 1976 p. 36

Dawkins starts his position as that of a staunch evolutionist and follower of Darwin. Through the mechanisms of natural selection, evolution and survival of the fittest we have the creatures around us today and this process is continuing all around us without us being aware of it. Pre-Dawkins we have thought of the individual or the species as the prime unit. We speak of ‘for the good of the species’ when an animal sacrifices its own interests in order to further the species as a whole. We talk of positive and negative evolutionary traits, of how creatures have evolved, over great expanses of time, to better survive and, consequently, better reproduce. Dawkins accepts this but suggests we shift our gaze from the group and from the individual to the gene. He suggests that evolutionary progress can instead be read as the furthering of the genes, not of the animals themselves who serve as little more than vehicles for these selfish beings.

Under this account, it is the genes that are competing and only the ‘fittest’ of these survive. It is their striving towards replication that is the essential mechanism behind their battle and their success in ‘replicating’ or not. Those genes that are the fittest will, naturally, replicate in greater numbers, and so a process akin to or, as Dawkins would say, that is evolution as we know it takes place on the genetic level. From this Dawkins posits the Selfish Gene, genes are no longer mere chemical informational units but are the driving force of evolution and life at the most basic level. It is for them that we breathe, eat, move and, most importantly, reproduce. It is not about passing on our genetic information, furthering our species or reproducing as an organism it is actually about allowing these genes to replicate themselves.

There have been many wide ranging attacks on this new approach to biology from scientists as well as from philosophers and I will now break these criticisms down into three types – those criticizing the notion of Selfishness with regards to genes, those criticizing Dawkins’ frame-shift and those attacking the purposiveness or intentional aspect of Dawkins theory.

Selfishness in Genes

The gut-reaction that many people have to Dawkins view is that genes simply cannot be selfish. As Mary Midgley succinctly puts it,

“Genes cannot be selfish or Unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or biscuits teleological.” Midgley 1979

But are we to take Dawkins talk of selfishness in seemingly inanimate objects as metaphor or as his literal view. Looking at the text itself it seems unclear as Dawkins seems to waiver from one to the other when it best suits him,

“Throughout this book, I have emphasized that we must not think of genes as conscious, purposeful agents.” Dawkins 1976 p. 210

However, he has opened this very book, in the preface, by telling us that we are nothing more than robots built to further the aims of the genes. This flip-flopping between metaphor and literality can often make it difficult to know exactly where Dawkins stands but, I feel, it is important to take his language as metaphor if we are to critically look at the rest of his work. To sweep everything to one side by claiming it to be meant literally may be tempting but by holding that this is merely a metaphor (albeit an odd one) then we may progress further in understanding what, of a fundamental scientific nature, Dawkins has to offer. Although I do hold with Midgley in her comment that,

“Why say selfish rather than self-preserving or self-replicating or self-perpetuating or competitive or the like?” Midgley 1983

Leaving the issue of metaphor/literality to one side, I hope now to question whether or not genes can really be thought of as selfish and if so, what this would mean for our biological interpretations of natural phenomena. There is, I feel, one central issue with regards to the selfish gene from which we can draw other more subtle criticisms of Dawkins and that is of to what degree and in what way can a gene be thought of as selfish.

Under my reading of Dawkins, it seems to suggest that whilst inhabiting its biological vehicle, the gene is hoping to be replicated and the selfishness or otherwise of the individual gene refers to its desire to get replicated rather than for the organism itself to reproduce. This would seem to paint a very isolationist view where each gene only looked out for its own survival and cared nothing for its fellow genes. However, this view seems to be inherently wrong when we look at biological example.

On a gene-eat-gene perspective we simply cannot hold that genes work for their own interests and for nothing else. Midgley quotes Dobzhansky as saying,

“The original conception of simple unit-characters had to be given up when it was discovered that the visible traits of organisms are mostly conditioned by the interaction of many genes and most genes have pleiotropic, or manifold, effects on many traits” Mankind Evolving p. 33 from Midgley 1979

The claim here is that we just cannot posit a view where each gene only looks to further itself because work in a fundamentally co-operative and co-dependent way. Dawkins responds to this by claiming that he, and other geneticists, mean when they say a gene produces a certain phenotypic effect is not of a one-to-one mapping nature but rather with one gene-difference one animal-difference. Dawkins, in his rebuttal of Midgley quotes himself as saying,

“A gene is defined as any portion of chromosomal material which potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of Natural Selection” The Selfish Gene p. 30 from Dawkins 1981

Taking this as one’s definition of a gene does seem to avoid the issue of genes only working for themselves but this does seem a little like shaping one’s definition to fit the theory. However, if we take Dawkins’ own definition onboard we still encounter other issues with regards to the selfishness of genes. These issues I will look at in the next section, that of the Intentionality and purposiveness.

Goal Oriented Genes

Dawkins has urged us to stop thinking of animals being those striving to reproduce and instead think of it as being the genes that are forever battling. Although Dawkins may have dispelled any lingering thought that we may have over him literally meaning that the genes are selfish (and this, for many people, is not the case) he has still given them a degree of teleology. These genes, although not literally aware are striving to replicate which suggests that they are doing it for some particular reason. It is a very basic principle that allows us to propose that if they are doing something, they aren’t doing nothing, and if they are doing nothing they must either have been made to do something or be doing something for a reason. Personally I do not feel that this need be such a sticking point for Dawkins as others have suggested. I do feel that his use of terms such as “selfish” which are so heavily laden with emotional and psychological connotations does invite talk of this kind. If we are simply frame-shifting from natural selection on the scale of individuals to natural-selection on the scale of genes we need no more talk of goals or reasons than we do with animals and evolution which is, under a Darwinian approach, largely random.

However, I do feel that a subtler objection to Dawkins can be made and that is of the mind-body problem. With so staunch a reductionist as Dawkins it may seem odd to challenge him with a problem as old and lingering as the mind-body problem but Ian Johnston of Malaspina University College disagrees, stating that the problem of human consciousness runs counter to the idea of Selfish Genes. He feels that if the conscious human mind has arisen by the actions of the genes, as Dawkins must believe, then there is an inherent clash between the wishes of the two.

“…it remains to be explained how a selfish gene can give rise by mechanical processes to something which counters it’s wishes, which can, in effect, ignore many of its demands. Dawkins, in other words, has yet to explain the connection between mind and body, and the way the former arises out of the latter and yet gets detached from it and, like some genetic Frankenstein’s monster, sets to wreak havoc on the genes with unnatural things like the welfare state and contraception.” Johnston 1997

This criticism I do think is a very significant one for Dawkins. Whilst we may hold true to the primacy of the gene it seems paradoxical that the genes should give rise to the mind and yet the mind can and does very often counter the desires of the genes. This doesn’t, however, invalidate the concept of selfish genes but merely suggests that it is an incomplete and perhaps to simplified a picture of how things really are.

My final section of criticism is going to focus on the frame-shift itself, asking how valid a move this is and whether it can hold both logically and empirically.

Frame-shifting: a matter of perspective

Dawkins has urged us to shift our perspective from that of individuals and groups to that of genes fighting for survival. He says that this is a more fundamental and, therefore, more accurate way to view things but I think that he is not without his shortcomings in insisting on this shift of focus.

Primarily I think Dawkins reasons for shifting focus are somewhat flawed. Holding genes as primary over individuals seems to have little justification. One might say that individuals alter and change from each time they reproduce whereas a copied gene mirrors its original perfectly. Were this true, however, evolutionary change would not be possible. The random changes in the genome give rise to a wide range of phenotypic variations.

It is also dubious to suggests that genes go around replicating themselves and this is what they are striving to do. People and animals and plants do indeed reproduce and make ‘copies’ of themselves but genes are replicated not replicators. This is an important distinction I think Dawkins misses and is well illustrated by Sober and Wilson,

“Are the pages fed into a copying machine “replicators”? To be sure, copies are made of them. But do they make copies of themselves? Arguably the answer is no. The pages are replicated but they are not replicators.”

Most importantly though, this is not just a language issue and has real implications for Dawkins and his theory. To suggest that genes are replicators is to give them control over what happens. As Sober and Wilson go on to say,

“One implication of the term “replicator” is that replicators control their own destiny. They actively make copies of themselves; they are not passive entities of which copies are made.” Sober and Wilson 1994

It has also been said that the gene cannot be the primary unit of selection any more than the organism itself can and that there are, in fact, two units of selection which compromise to form the new individual. In real world selection one organism chooses a mate based on the whole package. It may desire certain traits such as strength, speed etc but it cannot choose to take just these traits. Significantly, it is not a pick-n-mix affair, but the whole unit that is chosen and a compromise must be made. The creature chosen may be incredibly strong but also stupid, it may be fast but too vividly coloured and it is a balance between the whole and the parts that must be reached. Sober and Wilson say,

“The traits that then evolve will often present compromises between what is good for the whole and what is good for the parts.” Sober and Wilson 1994

This compromise will reflect not only an organism level choice but also a gene level choice. A gene, therefore, is affected but the genes around it. If it is a gene coding for unfortunately bright fur it may do well to piggyback with a gene for strength and agility. In this way genes cannot be the sole primary unit as the phenotypic, organism-wide effects of the genes will have an impact on whether or not the genes get replicated.

This shift in perspective seems to me to be odd also in the way that Dawkins insists that we stop at the genetic level. If we have moved down through group level, organism level and genetic level, it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose we could drop even further. This level I will call them physical level, meaning, literally, the level of fundamental physics.

On this level we can see the movement of energy through trophic systems, the use of energy and conversion of energy in biological chemical reactions and the input of energy from the sun. To me, this seems as just a valid level to interpret things as the genetic, if not more so! Genes are, in the end, nothing more than chemicals so it seems perfectly reasonable to reduce things to a merely physical level and there is evidence to support this in the form of thermodynamic approaches to biology.

It has relatively recently been suggested that natural world, the world of biology, can be understood from the point of view of thermodynamics, an area of physics that deals with temperature, pressure and volume and how it effects systems. Most significantly the 2nd law of Thermodynamics that says that, over time, order will decrease and energy will endeavour to disperse and stabilize as equally as possible. A perfect example of this is the Bénard Cell. When oil is placed between a hot and a cold panel the oil will move and the energy will try and pass from the hot to the cold until the whole thing is even. However, if temperature is rapidly increased small flow systems emerge that facilitate even more rapid stabilizing of temperature.

Thermodynamics: A Model for Life?

We can think of the Earth as exactly the same kind of thing. Energy is being put in, by the sun, and under the laws of thermodynamics, this needs to be equalized – a state of stability needs to be reached. In papers by James Kay and Eric Schneider a theory has been proposed whereby life has slowly evolved as an increasingly complex method by which energy can be ‘degraded’ in other words, life serves thermodynamics by taking the energy thrown at it and dispersing it in increasingly elaborate ways.

“If we view the Earth as an open thermodynamic system with a large gradient impressed on it by the sun, the thermodynamic imperative of the restated second law is that the system will strive to reduce this gradient by using all physical and chemical processes available to it.” Kay and Schneider 1994

It has even been shown by thermal imaging cameras that complex ecosystems do indeed perform in the ways predicted by Kay and Schneider.

They explain the biological functions that we know occur all around us by saying that these functions have arisen from the 2nd law of thermodynamics. As figure above shows, more complex biological systems better degrade the incoming solar energy, as a result is converted into other forms and does not cause a higher surface temperature. It is degraded through heat, transpiration, photosynthesis and the bonding of chemicals. Once in these forms it can then be further degraded by even more complex life leading to food chains beginning with phytoplankton and plants moving up to incredibly elaborate systems such as ourselves. They even suggest that social and cultural activity can be thought to be manifestations of the thermodynamic drive.

A Matter of Viewpoint

As valid as Kay and Schneider’s approach is, especially being backed up with all manner of empirical data, I feel it is no ‘truer’ a representation that Dawkins’s, Darwin’s or anyone else’s. Much in the manner of Daniel C Dennett’s layers of stances (physical, design and intentional) it seems that however we want to view biological beings is perfectly valid and is merely a matter of at which level we are wanting to speak; the level of species, organism, gene, chemical, atom or even energy. Dawkins does, however, have unresolved issues within his outlook that I feel hinder people from accepting what is, essentially, another perspective. His use of such loaded language as ‘selfish’ puts up an instant barrier to many as well as his ambiguity with regards to this talk being metaphorical or literal. Also, claiming complete fundamental primacy I have, hopefully, shown, is not correct, as there appear to be ever-deeper layers that can be delved in to. But, as another mode of expressing biological issues, talk of genes does seem a valid and informative approach.

Bibliography

Dawkins, Richard. “In Defence of Selfish Genes” in Philosophy Vol. 56 (1981)
The Selfish Gene - Oxford University Press (1976)

Johnston, Ian. “Lecture on Dawkins, The Selfish Gene” (released 1999) Text from http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/dawkins.htm

Midgley, M. “Gene-juggling” in Philosophy Vol. 54 (1979)
“Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism” in Philosophy Vol. 58 (1983)

Schneider, E.D. and Kay, J.J. "Life as a Manifestation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics", in Mathematical and Computer Modelling Vol 19, No. 6-8, p. 25-48 (1994)

Wilson, D.S. and Sober, E. “A Critical Review of Philosophical Work on the Units Of Selection Problem” in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61, No. 4 p. 534-555 (Dec. 1994)

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