Home | Philosophy | General

Carnap, Quine and the future of Metaphysics
By: the artist Monooq

THESIS:
This paper will show that as the dust settles over the Carnap-Quine dispute, the double standard concerning meaningfulness for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses that Carnap created has collapsed. This paper will challenge the verification theory of meaning as ultimately self-destructive, that is to say, meaningless under its own criterion. Finally, it will offer a view of metaphysics that may well withstand the pragmatic demands of philosophers such as Carnap and Quine.

In “The Elimination of Metaphysics”, Carnap charges that the statements of metaphysics are meaningless, not only metaphysics but also any philosophy of norms, values, and ethics. The sense in which he takes the word meaningless is quite clearly in the strict sense, that is, the statements of metaphysics are pseudo-statements. A pseudo-statement has either a word with no meaning, or uses improper sentence construction. For a word to have meaning the mode of its occurrence in a protocol sentence must be fixed. For a sentence to have meaning it must fulfill four criteria: first, it must have empirical criteria for its verification. Second, it must have fixed truth conditions. The method of its verification must be known, and the deducible protocol sentences must be known. As Carnap says, “the situation is that meaningful metaphysical statements are impossible. This follows from the task which metaphysics sets itself: to discover and formulate a kind of knowledge which is not accessible to empirical science.” Two particular characteristics are evident in Carnap’s philosophy in “The Elimination of Metaphysics”; strict empiricism as evidenced by the above quote, and strict reductionism.

Reductionism is the view that every statement can be reduced to “observation sentences”, and it is this that gives words and statements their meaning. All statements logically reduce to statements that express simple observational claims. Carnap says, “Metaphysical statements are not even acceptable as ‘working hypotheses’; for an hypothesis must be capable of entering into relations of deducibility with (true or false) empirical statements…” This view is implicit in the verification theory of meaning. The verification theory of meaning is just that the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it. A.J. Ayer distinguishes between weak and strong verifiability. This paper will later on challenge the verification theory of meaning, and it will do so using Ayer’s conception of weak verifiability; when it is possible for experience to render the statement in question probable. Carnap takes issue with natural languages because they allow the formation of meaningless statements without violating the rules of grammar. In a logically constructed language metaphysics would be technically impossible. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology is an extension of The Elimination of Metaphysics in that it tries to build upon this thought that language allows for meaninglessness by allowing improper use of words, and then offers a reason for, and solution to, meaninglessness.

For Carnap, metaphysics is not verifiable and therefore meaningless, and it is not verifiable because it uses our language incorrectly. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology divides up language into different linguistic frameworks, which are systems of syntactic and semantic rules for linguistic expression. Within linguistic frameworks, there are two types of statements: analytic and synthetic. An analytic statement has truth that is established purely on the meaning of its parts determined in the linguistic framework. In other words it is logically true and requires no verification. A synthetic statement requires empirical verification to determine its truth or falsity. Quine will reject the analytic-synthetic distinction ultimately because to accept that there are analytic truths is to accept that there are truths detached from experience, and this does not fit into Quine’s epistemological worldview. For Quine, there are no truths independent of possible experience, and the only way Carnap can legitimately distinguish analytic statements is by an appeal to the verification theory. The strategy invoked here is to show that the means of characterizing analyticity are circular, and that analyticity cannot be properly explained without the verification theory, which, by using it, contradicts what Carnap means by an analytic statement.

There are two types of analytic statements recognized here. The first type is logically true, for example: “no unmarried man is married”, it is true regardless of the meaning of the words because of its logical participles. Quine will argue against the unconditional truth of this statement from his Holistic worldview, but for now let us assume its truth. The second type of analytic statement takes the form of “no bachelor is married”. To Carnap this statement is analytic because bachelor is defined as ‘unmarried man’. To Quine, ‘bachelor’ does not reduce to ‘unmarried man’ by definition, because definition relies on a prior notion of synonymy. Synonymy can be clarified as the interchangeability of two words without change in truth-value, but the only way to know if words are interchangeable is to verify it through their use by people in the language. All attempts to explain analyticity require further clarification, and this is why Quine says a distinction drawn between analytic and synthetic is an “unempirical dogma of empiricists” . Richard Creath identifies that Quine demands sufficient verification of an allegedly synonymous term’s use in observational terms (how people use the term in day to day life). Furthermore, this is the same standard Carnap employs for descriptive terms in empirical science. It might be argued here that Quine contradicts his view that statements to not reduce to observation sentences on their own, only as a whole. However, even if true, this will not clarify an analytic-synthetic distinction, and is outside the purpose of this paper, which is now to show how Carnap’s internal-external distinction collapses.

Carnap recognizes two sorts of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities: the internal question, and the external question. An internal question is a question asked within a linguistic framework, phrased through the use of the forms of expression found in the linguistic framework. To Carnap, the answer to an internal question is either logical or empirical. For example, one of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks is ‘the world of things’, an internal question in this framework is, “Is there a paper in front of me?” The assumption of a linguistic framework presupposes the existence of the entities within it; therefore, any internal question of existence is trivially that the entity exists. The external question concerns the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, only the philosopher raises this sort of question. Huw Price sums up Carnap’s position against the external question precisely when he writes,

“We might say that on Carnap’s view, the metaphysician’s mistake is to think that he can stand in two places at the same time: both within the circle, so as to claim entitlement to use the terms that have their home there; and also outside the circle, so as to challenge what membership of the circle entails—to ask whether what it presupposes is actually true.”

The reason Carnap dismisses the external question is because we cannot ask the question without using the concepts within the framework concerned, and their use commits us to the existence of the entities within the framework concerned. In other words, linguistic frameworks are ontologically committing.

Asking the internal question of existence, for example the linguistic framework of numbers, presupposes the existence of numbers and therefore the answer becomes analytic. The answer is true according to the rules of the framework, and the framework indicates that numbers exist, that is the only way the framework can now work with numbers. If Quine has abolished the analytic-synthetic distinction by showing that ultimately even analytic statements require empirical verification, then Quine has also abolished Carnap’s belief that the internal question of existence is trivially true. The double standard concerning meaningfulness for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses in a system of linguistic frameworks cannot be held, because if ontological questions are asked internally they require verification.

The fact that Quine has reintroduced ontological questions as not meaningless in the strong sense of being non-sensical, does not mean that he does not still regard metaphysics as meaningless. Meaningless in the weak sense suggests that something is futile or pointless to ask, perhaps because it cannot be verified. Carnap and Quine each assume different conceptual schemes and epistemological worldviews. However they both share a common pragmatism and this pragmatism leads them to their disagreement on the analytic-synthetic distinction, the dividing of language into linguistic frameworks, and even how the verification theory can be applied. What works for Carnap to eliminate metaphysics is not what works for Quine to support his Holistic worldview. But still, both philosophers would agree that metaphysics is meaningless in the weak sense of being totally pointless to inquire into.

This paper would not live up to its title if it did not address the supposed uselessness of metaphysics, but first it must address the verification theory of meaning. As stated, the verification theory says that the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it. If the verification theory demands conclusive verification for any sentence to be meaningful, then it is itself meaningless. Conclusive verification rules out all sentences of universal form, and therefore statements that express general laws. A.J. Ayer recognizes this and so does Carl Hempel when he says, “…for these cannot be conclusively verified by any finite set of observational data.” So Ayer falls back to the weaker sense of verification, which he states as, “Would any observations be relevant to the determination of [a statement’s] truth or falsehood?” Hempel is not satisfied, he continues to say that the verification theory is not an empirical hypothesis, nor analytic, and so still questionably devoid of cognitive meaning by its own standard. He offers that the verification theory “indicates what empiricists propose to understand by a cognitively significant sentence”, and therefore, having not the character of an assertion, is neither true nor false. It seems absurd to think the verification theory could be thrown away so easily, and doing so is certainly not an aim of this paper. It is however, to challenge the assumption that simply because metaphysics purports to originate a knowledge that is beyond empirical science, that it is therefore meaningless in the weak sense.

It is thought that the term metaphysics originated from an editor of Aristotle’s works as the name for the part of his writings that came after the Physics; ontology, cosmology, causes and processes and other obscure subjects. We will stick to Carnap’s loose definition of metaphysics as the study of things not accessible to empirical science. P.K. Feyerabend writes, “Elimination of all metaphysics, far from increasing the empirical content of the remaining theories, is liable to turn these theories into dogmas.” What could he mean by this? Feyerabend says that the Copernican idea of the motion of the earth did not posses any independent observational support for at least the first 150 years of its existence. It was inconsistent with the facts of confirmed physical theories. What Feyerabend is getting at is that metaphysical systems are scientific theories in their most primitive stage. They lay the proper groundwork from which a theory grows. The scientific findings that stem directly from sense-data are limited. Rather, at the formation of a theory there is a conscious or unconscious metaphysic assumed. Now what theory could there possibly be that did not stem from, nor was activated by, direct observables but rather a feeling about how things work? Perhaps Democritus’ theory of atoms was one of them. What are needed to substantiate this thought are theories that could not have stemmed directly from sense-data.

Einstein’s theory of Dark Energy introduced a cosmological constant to explain the possibility that empty space has energy and couples to gravity. A theory such as this is today somewhat empirically testable, but to say that this theory was caused by observables that would go toward its proof is wrong, because when Einstein conceived of it there was no proof to its effect, and the existing theory was as capable as any. It seems more reasonable to think that Einstein was working with what scientific knowledge he had, and formulated a view of the universe, and Dark Energy comes about because of his inquiry into un-observable things. The same can be said for a paper released at the 53rd International Conference on Nuclear Spectroscopy and Nuclear Structure at Moscow State University last year. The paper called “The Bases of the Vortex Theory” by Russell Moon argued that time is not a fundamental principle of the universe. Time is a function of motion; an illusion created by motion. For a theory to come to such a conclusion, validated by scientists on its mathematical procedures, could not have been because any part of the theory had initially conceivable conditions that would go toward its truth or falsity. Empiricists who demand that science start from observable facts and proceed by generalization will be seriously limiting themselves if their goal is scientific and empirical knowledge, and not simply to block obscure metaphysics.

Carnap’s arguments for the elimination of metaphysics were arguably the furthest advance of the logical empiricists on that front. Just as Carnap’s argument for the elimination of metaphysics rests on the verification theory of meaning, so to does the rebuttal that ontological questions of existence are meaningful rest on the refutation of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Both are subject to criticism. One convincing attack on Quine’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction comes from H.P Grice and P.F. Strawson from their paper, “In Defense of a Dogma”. They say that those who use ‘analytic’ apply the term to the same cases, and hesitate over the same cases; it has an established philosophical use and therefore it seems absurd to deny such a distinction. Richard Creath continues the thought to say there is nothing more needed to mark a distinction than the feeling that there are kinds of cases to which ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ apply. It is doubtful that this would be accepted by Carnap’s empiricism. And if allowed then perhaps they will accept the meaningfulness of metaphysics on the feeling that it has meaning.

Carnap’s internal-external distinction does not stand up if the analytic-synthetic distinction does not. The verification theory can offer no fatal blow to metaphysics, and there is a use for metaphysics after all. Carnap seems to have failed in his elimination of metaphysics and ontological questions of existence, and the war against metaphysics seems to have been lost. However, rarely is a dispute in philosophy decided so decisively. It may be as Huw Price says that because of Quine’s influence, what passes for metaphysics today is not what Carnap and the logical positivists went to war against.

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

Please Rate this Article

 

# of Ratings = 2 | Rating = 3.5/5

Click the XML Icon Above to Receive General Articles Via RSS!
Additional Articles From - Home | Philosophy | General
Sign Up as an Author.
Submit Articles
Member Login
Top Authors
Most Popular Articles
Submission Guidelines
Ezine Notifications
Article RSS Feeds
New Stuff
Forum
Link to Us
Contact Us

Powered by Article Dashboard