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A Critical Disscussion of the Reality Principle as the Heart of Freudian Psychoanalysis
By: daniel ohalloran

In his work ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ Freud seeks to posit a metapsychological account of the pleasure principle and thus in doing so go beyond that which can be known about it from the empirical data available. In doing so Freud will claim to uncover a regulatory principle that he names the ‘reality principle’ [1989:7] , this principle is that which forbids the excitation of inappropriate and dangerous libidinal energies and binds them until an appropriate manner of cathexis is achieved. This essay will seek to locate, through a close examination of a variety of Freudian texts and in particular the aforementioned ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, this principle at the heart of psychoanalysis. Once this reality principle has been elucidated within Freud’s topographical, economic and dynamic models of the human mind, its undoubted importance to psychoanalytic theory will consequently be revealed. Upon this revelation it will then be possible to offer a critical account of this formation of the mind by referencing the work of the 19th century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche who offers a significantly different conception of the makeup of the human mind. This critique will focus solely on the foundation within Freudian theory of the ‘principle of constancy’ which is a function of the mental apparatus of which the pleasure principle belongs as a tendency [1988:76] and is therefore the basis of on which both the pleasure and reality principles stand as the reality principle itself regulates the pleasure principle. It appears reasonable to conclude that as ‘the pleasure principle follows from the principle of constancy’ and ‘the pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle’ [1988:7] that if one were to undermine this cornerstone of Freud’s theory then one would consequently undermine much of the Freudian psychological edifice. The key to these two differing conceptions of the human mind will be the notions of energy or power that they propose; for Freud the energies of the individual constantly seek a state of equilibrium or constancy free from excitations, whereas Nietzsche will attempt to show that the continual striving of these energies for dominance within the organism are the very essence of life and that to equalise these, as a nirvana principle [1988:67] does, is tantamount to a denial of the very essence of life. As Nietzsche states in his work ‘The Anti-Christ’:

‘What is Happiness? – the feeling that power is growing, that some resistance has been overcome’ [2006:4]

This notion of overcoming is central to the post-structualist movement of the 20th century and will lead thinkers such as Pierre Klossowski to attempt to articulate a notion of agency that is ever shifting through the fluctuations in excitations created by the individuals tendency towards the accumulation of power. A central unity of self is merely a phantasm held together by a code of everyday signs thus creating a simulacrum named ‘I’, the notion of a unified self he declares as a purely institutional distinction’ [2005:30]. Although it should be noted that some modern thinkers, such as Lyotard in his work ‘Libidinal Economy’ respond to claims such as this, as being a type of madness, as Lyotard states:

‘Nietzsche [] a madman determined to judge a given swim as unexchangeable for any other, []a madman ready to want a proper name [] for each intensity, and thus to die with each of them, to lose even his memory [] and certainly his own identity.’ [1993:26]

Before the relevance of these criticisms and counter criticisms can be brought to bear upon Freud’s metapsychological model one must first understand how this model is constructed and implemented by Freud which will be possible through a discussion of the position of the reality principle within this system. Through a thorough examination of this central tenet of psychoanalysis, its topographical, dynamic and economic importance will be revealed and as such will explicate much of Freud’s theory of the mind and in so doing it should make it possible to ascertain as to whether the Nietzschean criticism is acceptable.

Topographically the reality principle is located within the preconscious – conscious system; dynamically its significance is that it is a defensive drive belonging to the ego and economically it takes free libidinal energy and binds it for excitation at an acceptable time or in an acceptable manner. Freud sets this up in the following way, he argues that economically the mind works upon a principal of constancy [1995:88] and as such the pleasure principle functions by a process of creating equilibrium. This is to say that the mind seeks from the outset to be economically balanced with regards to its primitive drives and thus seeks a free and immediate excitation for them, the agency of the id works by attempting to return to a previous state in which the force of the libido, in being satisfied, is no longer causing a state of unpleasure. The idea being that unpleasure is caused by an increase in energy within the system which begins in a state of equilibrium and desires only to return to this state by sating the appetites of the id, as Freud suggests:

‘It will perhaps not be thought to rash to suppose that the impulses arising from the instincts do not belong to the type of bound nervous processes but of freely mobile processes which press towards discharge’ [1989:40]

These libidinal impulses, these primary instincts are unconscious and as such belong solely to the agency of the id [1995:639]. These impulses strive for satisfaction and when they are not satisfied proceed to create disequilibrium within the organism so as to cause it unpleasure, by way of the fact that they disrupt the normal energetic economy which is naturally in a state of harmony. This disharmony is a result of the id’s position as ‘the great reservoir of libido’ [1995:639] of which the other agencies of ego and super-ego draw their energies, thus when the ego’s reality principle kicks in and represses these drives so as to protect the organism it has as a consequence the effect of destabilising the original harmony that is dependent upon the release of energies so as to stop a build up of excitation. Therefore it is concluded that one can infer from the pleasure principle a principle of constancy [1989:6] as pleasure is equal to a state free from excitation. Freud immediately finds this notion problematic in the sense that if the pleasure principle were to dominate the human mind then it stands to reason that each of us should find ourselves in a state of constant pleasure whereas this is quite clearly not the case. In opposition to this primary manner of mental functioning ‘a new principle of mental functioning was [] introduced; what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real’ [1995:302] this reality principle emerges as a defence mechanism protecting the organism from damaging itself by recklessly seeking a state free from the demands of libido or rather a state in which the libido is constantly satisfied. This is why the reality principle operates at the preconscious – conscious level through its accessibility it functions so as to safeguard the pleasure principle from itself, a momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain [] an assured pleasure at a later time’ [1995:304]. Freud attempts to highlight this re-channelling of the energy of the pleasure principle within the condition of traumatic neurosis which reveals itself as a compulsion to repeat [1989:10]. To do this he explains the differing connotations of three seemingly interchangeable terms, fright, fear and anxiety [1989:11]. For Freud each of these feelings has a different affect upon the individual and only fright is capable of causing a traumatic neurosis. The reason for denying that these other two emotions are capable of the causation of a traumatic neurosis is that fear has an object to be afraid of and anxiety is an expectation of a danger yet to come. As such both emotions belong to a defence mechanism aimed at the avoidance of fright which can cause traumas through the unexpected increases in excitations that they cause within the mind, Freud argues:

‘In the case of quite a number of traumas, the difference between systems that are unprepared and systems that are well prepared through being hypercathected may be a decisive factor in determining the outcome’ [1989:36]

This discussion of what causes traumatic neurosis leads Freud to a crucial point in the development of his thoughts that has far reaching consequences for his whole psychological system. He notes the fact that dream analysis reveals to the analyst that dreams in the traumatic state bring ‘the patient back into the situation of his accident’ [1989:11] which is not compatible with the theory of dreams in which dreams are seen as wish fulfilments of the unconscious. How, is it then possible one must ask, for these traumatic dreams to be part of a psychological model in which dreams function as a way of harmlessly fulfilling wishes in conjunction with the pleasure principle as modified by the reality principle? Freud answers this by suggesting that the compulsion to repeat that emerges in this type of mental illness is:

‘Something that seems more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle which it over-rides’ [1989:25]

Here then is his first step towards a going beyond the pleasure principle which leads Freud to postulate a death drive as that which is over and beyond the pleasure principle. Using examples from the natural world and embryology Freud makes the claim that all instincts tend towards the restoration ‘of an earlier state of things’[1989:43]. This is to say that the organism continually seeks to find the historically ideal point, which in its perfection led to the emergence of the species and as such is the optimum conditions for the organism to repeat its day to day existence within. For Freud this will lead to confusion as this instinct, by its very nature, will have the ‘deceptive appearance of [] tending towards change and progress’ [1989:45] whereas as its constant attempts to change its conditions are merely an attempt to return to that optimum state which saw its initial development and it is this which drives it constantly in search of this perfect Faustian moment. This then is the principle upon which the pleasure principle and therefore the reality principle stand; the defensive reality principle is merely a function which ensures ‘that the organism shall follow its own path to death’ and as such is initially compared to a short circuit [1989:47]. The claim of a short circuit is corrected later in the penultimate chapter of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ and the tension between Eros [life instinct] and Thanatos [death instinct] is elucidated as the chief tension that creates mental life. He argues that rather than the organism short circuiting and thus sabotaging its own attempts at attaining that which it is naturally inclined to attempt to attain, namely death. What happens is that in the beginning, at the very moment of perfection which Freud envisages, in which living substance becomes alive, it is also separated. In separation they hardened as a means of protection but in doing so prevented the possibility of ever remerging with that from which they had come. This though does not stop the organism from being driven by its most natural of instincts towards a reunion which is the notion of life instincts always striving to re-amalgamate themselves through the sexual act and thus the creation of life is given as totally compatible with drives motivated by death and in fact this very tension is at the heart of the human mind. Therefore the death instincts seek to restore a particular quality, as it were; they seek a qualitative state in which the principle of constancy holds. Whereas the life instincts seek a particular quantitative state in which they are restored back to an original mass from which they originated. This is how both sets of instincts are correlated; the death instinct through the pleasure principle seeks a state of nirvana but, for this state to be realised which is to say an original optimum state, it must be returned not just in the quality of its energy but also in the quantity of its parts. The optimum moment of which Freud speaks is not just a qualitative moment but, also a quantitative one. These instincts through the very fact that they are oppositional in nature create that which is a human being as Laplanche and Pontalis note:

‘the two types of instinct stand opposed to one another as two great principles said to be already observable in the inanimate world [attraction/repulsion] and, above all, to be the basis of the phenomena of life’ [1988:241]

This manoeuvre leads to the positing of a psychological model in which there exists a pleasure principle propelled by its death instinct but impotent to fulfil the needs of this principle due to its reality principle which enlightens it to the fact that it cannot realise a principle of constancy without equalising both its quantity and quality. This is to say that the very paradox of the Freudian model is its impotency to reach a state in which it achieves satisfaction, as the hardening of the body prevents the very intermingling that the sexual impulse requires for its true satisfaction. The qualitative constancy that is required of a nirvana principle can only reach an optimum state within the organism, a state that saw the very emergence of the organism into existence, when it is also a part of a constant quantitative state as well. Therefore the organism strives through the impulses of its love instincts to attain this unattainable state of quantitative equilibrium through its sexual need to procreate and thus for a moment in time unify itself with another and bring an element of that which is now missing, from it, back for a time at least. As has been clearly stated above and within Freud’s texts this whole system is dependant upon the primary, economic principle of constancy which is typified by the death drives push towards a state of nirvana. It is at this point when the post-structural reading of Nietzsche has great prevalence, this can be seen in Klossowski’s work ‘Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle’ in which he brings to his readers attention to the following passage in which Nietzsche discusses the individuals, internal, energetic, economy:

‘not merely conservation of energy, but maximal economy in use, so the only reality is the will to grow stronger of every centre of force - not self-preservation, but the will to appropriate, dominate, increase, grow stronger.’ [2005:85]

It is quite clear that Nietzsche’s position is diametrically opposed to the idea of a nirvana principle, in contrast this is a model of an energy gathering organism whose pleasure principle works in a completely different way to that of the Freudian one, as is expressed in the following Nietzschean declaration that:

‘One must talk the Germans out of their Mephistopheles, and their Faust, too. They are two moral prejudices against the value of knowledge’ [2006:137]

Here he is attempting to show that Faust’s attempts to find a moment so perfect that he never wishes to leave are, as it were, anti-knowledge in that the value of knowledge can never be found within its dissolution but rather must be found within its expansion. This is to say that if knowledge is frozen then it losses its value and as such only through being able to develop and expand does it contain that which makes it valuable. This applies to the Freudian model of the mind in the following manner; Freud states that the mind seeks a constant state free from excitation and as such has as its chief motivation a nirvana principle which is sought by a death drive, this for Nietzsche is the search for a static moment in which values are frozen and as such life is removed from life, as the human organism is a value creating organism. For Freud values and arts and all such non-essential social nuances emerge as a by product of an organism motivated by its primary impulses which are redirected by the reality principle into objects. Whereas Nietzsche’s opposition will be to say that this indirect manner of valuation of mankind’s world is false and that the establishment of value is a primary function which without Freud would be unable in the first place to posit his psychological system. This point of tension can be drawn out further if one considers the example Freud offers in Chapter Two of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in which he refers to the invention of a game by a young child and the way in which the child uses this game in a repetitive manner as a way of dealing with certain unpleasant situations [1989:12-17]. At the conclusion of this discussion Freud offers two conflicting reasons as to why this particular manner of behaviour might develop and manifest itself through these games. Either the child develops these games from ‘an instinct for mastery’ which allows him to take ‘on an active part’ [1989:15] or as an act of revenge which cannot be actualised upon the person for whom it is intended. It would not seem too bold at this point to suggest that Nietzsche would argue that Freud had uncovered the two basic character types of the master and the slave. The mentality of the master, for Nietzsche, being one in which an active part is taken to an event so as to take control of it, thus the master creates values by the very manner of its existence. This is to say that, throughout his works, in an attempt at a revaluation of all value Nietzsche contends that value is a completely esoteric notion; value is given to external objects that have no value as it were in-themselves. This need for mastery which Freud suggests would be independent of any pleasurable or unpleasurable affects is the epitome of Nietzsche’s urgings that one should embrace tragic chance and that to deny it is a value judgement against life. For Nietzsche the taking control of ones environment and mastering the unpleasure, as Freud would use the expression, is the behaviour of the noble character that needs no affirmation for its existence, which is to say that it does not need another to justify its existence for it. Whereas the second example offered by Freud which is that of revenge upon a substitute [1989:17] appears to resonate within the following Nietzschean quote:

‘The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of beings denied the true reaction, that of the deed, who recover their losses only through an imaginary revenge.’ [1998:19]

If one uses this as a template to interpret the Freudian example then instead of the actions of the child being in a situation in which it either behaves in this manner because of statement A or because of statement B. These statements cease to be oppositional in that this child can do both, he may seek mastery over the situation but if he fails to achieve this then it is conceivable for Nietzsche that he will shift his manner of valuation and thus take up a vengeful position. This ability to be either/or, this ability to take up a different perspective upon value seems to be somewhat missing from the Freudian model based upon the principle of constancy. For Freud the organism seeks a state of equilibrium in which everything is stable and free from the trauma of unpleasures caused by an increase in excitation within the system. Whereas Nietzsche would seemingly view this type of existence as being one of sickness in which life is being judged [2006:162], as it makes the judgement claim that unpleasure should not be a part of life and only through its removal can the organism reach its optimum state. This is to confuse the cause and effect [2006:176] as pleasure and unpleasure are valuations of life but, these valuations are only possible because of the particular existence that the value giving organism has which is to say that life is prior to valuation. These unpleasures which Freud seeks to remove so as to make the organism happy are, for Nietzsche, an integral part of the whole system which allowed the value creating organism to emerge in the first place. It therefore follows that if one were to remove one of these primary elements, one would be removing life and if this is the case it follows that it is impossible to give the value judgement which led to this as that which was essential to the value creating organism has been removed.

It therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that the reality principle is at the heart of psychoanalysis, if one accepts the psychoanalytic model proposed by Freud. This is due to the fact that it is the necessary principle of self-defence which the organism employs so as to attain its goals and without it the organism would never survive long enough to attain its goals because it would have only pleasure as interest and would not bother to protect itself. Although if one accepts the arguments of thinkers such as Nietzsche, then the constancy principle upon which the reality principle stands is a somewhat dubious claim and hence the reality principle as posited by Freud becomes an untenable position.

Bibliography

Deleuze, G, 2005, ‘Nietzsche and Philosophy’, Continuum, London

Freud, S, 1989, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, W.W. Norton and Company, London

Gay, P [ed], 1995, ‘The Freud Reader’, Vintage, London

Klossowski, P, 2005, ‘Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle’, Continuum, London

Lacan, J, 2006, ‘Écrits: a selection’, Routledge Classics, London

Laplanche, J and Pontalis, J-B, 1988, ‘The Language of Psychoanalysis’ Karnac Books, London

Lyotard, J-F, 1993, ‘Libidinal Economy’, The Athlone Press, London

Nietzsche, F, 1998, ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’, Hackett, Cambridge

Nietzsche, F, 2006, ‘The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Nietzsche, F, 2006, ‘The Gay Science’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Internet Resources

http://www.freud.org.uk/fmrese.htm

http://www.answers.com/topic/reality-principle?cat=health

http://www.colorado.edu/English/courses/ENGL2012Klages/freud.html

http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/freud.htm

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/childhood/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/

http://notebookeleven.com/

Article Source: http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com

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